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The Meaning of "Religion" in the First Amendment
Lee J. Strang
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article attempts to define the meaning of the word
"religion" in the First Amendment. In doing so, this Article will not
sidestep the debate over the emphasis on original meaning in
constitutional interpretation, and instead draws upon the meaning
attributed to the word "religion" in the Constitution by the Framers
and Ratifiers of the First Amendment. While this Article contends
that the criteria by which to judge the meaning of the text of the
Constitution is the meaning attributed to the text by the Ratifiers,
one must be mindful of the position taken by almost all
constitutional scholars; that the original meaning of the text is
important and is at least the starting point of constitutional
interpretation.' The meaning sought is not the subjective meaning
attributed by individual Ratifiers to the word religion, but rather
the objectified meaning of the text as generally understood by all
2
the Ratifiers.
Research to establish the meaning of the word religion in 1791
was difficult because a definition was never laid out by anyone in
the founding generation. Instead, it seemed that religion and
Christianity were often used interchangeably. 3 There were also
instances where questions arose where it seemed religion was used
1. See e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERIcAN
CONSTITUTION (1996) (advocating interpreting the Constitution based on a moral reading of
the Constitution's text); JUSTICE ANTONIN SCAuA, A MAT'ER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 37-41 (1997) [hereinafter SCAiA, INTERPRETATION] (identifying Justice Scalia's
mode of interpretation which seeks to find, not the subjective intent of the Framers or
Ratifiers, but the objective meaning of the text as was used by society when the text
received its authority); LAURENCE H. TRIB, AMERICAN CONsTrrtmONAL LAW 49-57 (3d ed. 2000)
(stating that the original meaning of the text is the "starting point" of constitutional
interpretation).
2. See SCAuA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1,at 17 (stating *we do not really look for
subjective ... intent. We look for a sort of 'objectified' intent- the intent that a reasonable
person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus

juris").
3. This is likely because Christianity was viewed as a religion, and the far dominate
religion at the time, so to use the two interchangeably does not necessarily imply that other
non-Christian belief systems are not religions within the original meaning, only that
Christianity was surely considered a religion.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 40:181

in a more expansive manner to include other monotheistic
religions. On the other hand, the Framers and Ratifiers, while
seeking to prevent the domination of one Christian sect over all
others in the new government, may have feared the "prostration" of
Christianity to non-Christian religions - Judaism and Islam - and
to atheists and pagans.4 This fear would have led to a more narrow
definition of religion.
It is the contention of this Article that "religion," in 1791, meant
at least what we would think of today as a traditional theistic
belief in a God with concomitant duties, which imply a future state
of rewards and punishments. 5 In other words, while religion very
likely meant something narrower than simply theistic belief
systems, such as monotheism, religion did not reach any broader
than theism. The original meaning thus seems to include under the
rubric of religion only monotheistic beliefs such as Christianity,
Judaism, or Islam. It also appears to be unlikely, given the
historical evidence, that religion was thought to include polytheistic
beliefs. It is clear that religion did not encompass atheism, or what
the Court often refers to today as "irreligion."6 Consequently, the
original meaning of the word religion cannot offer an exact
4. Joseph Story in his famous Commentaries, observed that the "real object of the
[first]
amendment was, not to countenance, much less advance Mahometanism, or Judaism,
or infidelity, by prostrating christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects .... "
JOSEPH STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrrUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 594 (2d ed. 1851).
5. The meaning of religion appears to have evolved from the definition given by this
Article as the original meaning, to today's inclusion of non-theistic beliefs. See e.g., JOHN
KERSEY, DIcroNAIuuM ANGLO-BRITANNICUM (1708 London) (1969 facsimile) (defining religion as
"the Worship of a Deity"); NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMEmCAN DICIaONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828) (1970 facsimile) (emphasis added) (giving four definitions of religion: "1. Religion, in
its most comprehensive sense includes a belief in the being and perfection of God, in the
revelation of his will to man, in man's obligation to obey his commands, in a state of reward
and punishment, and in man's accountableness to God. . . . It therefore comprehends
theology as a system of doctrines and principles... for the practice of moral duties without
a belief in a divine lawgiver, and without reference to his will or commands, is not a
religion"); SAMUEL, JOHNSON & JOHN, WALKER DICIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (7th ed.
London 1853) (stating "[v]irtue, as founded upon reverence of God, and expectation of future
rewards and punishments; a system of divine faith and worship as opposite to others");
WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICrIONARY 1527 (2d ed. 1983) (including the definitions
used in the 1828 Webster's, but also now "loosely" defining religion to include a "system of
beliefs, practices, ethical, moral etc. resembling, suggestive of . . . such a system; as
humanism is to religion"). As a result, while originally defined to include only what this
Article asserts to be the original meaning of religion in the First Amendment, the meaning of
religion as defined in dictionaries has expanded to include non-theistic beliefs.
6. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994). In one
of the numerous letters to President Washington from the many denominations of the new
nation, the Quakers wrote that they prayed to God that Washington would be an effective
instrument in God's hands to suppress "Vice, Infidelity and Irreligion . . . ." Letter from
George Washington to the Society of Quakers, in 4 THE ARTnCLES OF GEORGE WASHINGTON
265-67 (W. W. Abbott & Dorothy Twohig eds., 1993) (October, 1789). The Quakers, like others
of the era, distinguished and elevated religious belief, above "Irreligion," which was
denigrated and seen as different in kind than religion and as something for government to
actively suppress.
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abstract definition. Nevertheless, original meaning interpretation in
this instance' can offer a continuum whereby traditional
mono-theistic beliefs, and certainly Christianity, are included as
religions, while belief systems based on non-theistic views of the
world - philosophy for example - are not included in the
8
definition of religion.
Consequently, a religion in the First Amendment context has
several attributes: a religion is at least theistic, and likely
monotheistic, the Supreme Being to whom the belief system claims
adherence requires the believer to. do and refrain from doing
certain things, and the belief system must profess a future state of
rewards and punishment. 9
II.

THE

ORIGINAL MEANING OF "RELIGION" IN THE FIRST AMENDMENT

SHOULD FORM THE BASIS OF RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE

A.

Arguments for Originalism Generally

The debate over how to interpret the Constitution has been with
us since the dawn of the Republic. 10 Today there are essentially two
camps as to what is the proper" constitutional interpretative
methodology: originalism and nonoriginalism. Within each school
there are numerous divisions and subdivisions, but for purposes of
this Article, the type of originalism adopted is that advocated by
7. In relation to the question of what was the original meaning of the word religion in
the First Amendment.
8. Richard Kay, in his article, Adherence to the OriginalIntentions in Constitutional
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 226, 243-44 (1988), argues
that judges do not need to know precisely the abstract definition or meaning of all the text
in the Constitution for original intention interpretation to work. On the contrary, judges need
only, in each specific case brought before them, decide which litigant's position is more akin
to the original intent of the text. Id. This is a much easier proposition that requires only a
"good faith judgement about which result is more likely consistent with the [original) intent."
Id. Stated another way, the original meaning can be less than perfectly defined in the
abstract and still be adequate because the judge has only to say which of two propositions
offered by the litigants is more like or dislike the original meaning, and rule accordingly.
9. It also appears that a religion was also seen as possessing at least a rudimentary
organization.
10. See e.g., Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the
Interpretationof 'This Constitution', 72 IowA L REV. 1177 (1987) (surveying the history of
constitutional interpretation including the interpretative methodologies of the Framers and
Ratifiers); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of OriginalIntent, 98 HARv. L
REV. 885 (1985) (asserting that the Framers did not want the courts to use originalist
interpretation).
11. Or the just, or best, or most workable methodology.
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Justice Scalia: original meaning interpretation.' 2 Original meaning
adjudication does not look to the subjective intent of the Framers
or Ratifiers as a guide to the meaning of the Constitution. 13 Instead,
judges must seek to ascertain the meaning of the text as generally
understood by those who gave the text its authority, the Ratifiers
and people of the states. 14 As Justice Scalia writes: "[w]e
[originalists] look for a sort of 'objectified' intent - the intent that
a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed
along side the remainder of the corpus juris."5
What follows is a preliminary and incomplete description of the
debate surrounding constitutional interpretation. The argument for
originalism and the normative values advanced by originalists are
examined. Arguments against nonoriginalism are then briefly
covered. The moral force of this Article then follows with an
exposition of a new theory of moral justification for originalism
based on the theory of the just state as the minimal state. Finally,
the full force of the normative arguments for originalism, including
this Article's moral theory undergirding originalism, will be applied
to the debate surrounding religion and the First Amendment.
For the originalist, the dictionary is a useful tool to gain access
to the meaning of the text contemporary to ratification. 16 The
writings of the Framers, especially The FederalistPapers, are also
useful to ascertain what the text meant. 7 In addition, one can look
to the writings of contemporaries of ratification to ascertain how a
particular word or phrase was used in context to better arrive at
the general societal meaning attributed to the word or phrase.
Finally, the originalist must be familiar with the historical
background and circumstances that surrounded the ratification of
8
the text in question to better ascertain its original meaning.
Originalist writers support originalism with numerous different
12. ScALiA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 17.
13. See id. at 38 (rejecting the use of the subjective intent of the Framers in
constitutional interpretation).

14. Id. at 17.
15. Id.
16. See supra note 5 (giving dictionary definitions of religion contemporary to the
ratification of the First Amendment); SCALA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 23. Justice
Scalia notes that in "sophisticated circles" resort to such mundane tools as dictionaries,
contemporary writings and context seems "unimaginative." Id. While Scalia disputes this
proposition, claiming that originalists must know history, context and theory, these so-called
drawbacks of originalsim make it all the better to fulfill one of the major goals of
originalism- cabin judicial discretion. Id.
17. Id. at 38.
18.

Id. at 23.
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normative claims. The standard and most mentioned are: stability,
the rule of law, separation of powers and democratic theory
(reducing judicial discretion and increasing the sway of popular
voices), and protection of minority rights and equality. Justice
Scalia argues initially that the principle of separation of powers,
with the legislative branch being the lawmaking branch, requires
the judiciary to limit its purview to the application of laws and the
Constitution, and not to the creation of constitutional rights. 19
Essentially, with the legislature being directly elected by the
people, in whom all sovereignty resides, and the judiciary being
relatively isolated and not responsible to the people, the judiciary
can only legitimately overturn a decision by the people when
relying on and enforcing a prior authoritative act of the people 20
the Constitution.
Originalism enhances stability over other, nonoriginalist
methodologies by reaffirming that the text of the Constitution has a
permanent meaning that does not change except through the
Article VI amendment process. 21 With stability being of paramount
importance to any civilized society,22 and with a Constitution that
was put in writing so as not to change, 23 the notice and peace of
mind (for personal as well as business reasons) that come with
knowledge that the meaning of our governing document does not
change are important values to be weighed in the balance.24
19. Id. at 9-10.
20. Id. at 9-10, 40-47. See also Kay supra note 8, at 289-90 (questioning how
nonoriginalists overcome the counter-majoritarian difficulty).
21. See ScAuA, INTERPRETATON, supra note 1, at 41-47 (criticizing nonoriginalists for
their lack of guiding principles as to what the meaning of the Constitution will change to).
See also Kay, supra note 8, at 286-88, 291-92 (claiming that originalism increases stability).
22. See generally SAINT THoMAs AQUINAS, SMuMA THEOwOGICA at prima secunda, Qu. 97,
Art. 2 (stating "the very fact of change in the law is, in a certain sense, detrimental to the
public welfare").
23. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 176 (1803) (stating "[c]ertainly, all
those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental
and paramount law of the nation").
24. For another view on how a form of stability can normatively support originalism
see Clinton, supra note 10. According to Clinton, when courts are faced with a constitutional
question they must first look for an answer in the original intent of the Constitution. Id. at
1264-78. This is because constitutional stability is advanced when society believes courts are
indeed searching for the meaning of the constitution. See id. at 1259, 1261-63 (asserting that
constitutional stability "has cultural, social, and economic importance" in that society is
better able to function when all respect the constitutional decision handed down by courts).
Professor Clinton proposes that judges look to other normative values when there is
arguably no original meaning to control the disposition of the case at hand. Id. at 1264-76.
Stability, as understood by Clinton, is not affected when modem problems facing society not
envisioned by the Founders are resolved employing contemporary morality.
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It is the emphasis on stability and notice that motivated Justice
Scalia's Article, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules.2 5 In his Article,
Justice Scalia notes that in a democracy the rule of law - rules
promulgated by the people - is given preference. 26 Rules give
notice to those governed by the rules, carry the imprimatur of the
representative branches, lessen judicial discretion, and do "justice"
to most that fall under the rule. 27 These rules include constitutional
clauses and provisions because the same rule of law values that
apply to legislatively enacted rules also apply to constitutional
rules. Because of their clarity, rules are easy to criticize and
replace if considered unjust as contrasted to judicial decisions,
especially constitutional decisions, that rely on amorphous, ad-hoc
balancing to determine the "just" outcome. 28 Rules also improve the
equal application of the law because there is little room for judges
of different persuasion to dispense punishment, as opposed to
balancing, where the factors considered count for nothing or
everything depending on the judge and the party appearing before
hil.29

Another, more ingenious tactic is the claim by originalists that a
nonoriginalist methodology of interpretation can lead to a
diminution of the protection afforded individual rights.30 This is
ironic because liberals generally presume that nonoriginalism leads
to greater protection of rights as compared to originalism. While
the extent of rights protection by the Bill of Rights under an
originalist approach may not be as broad as liberals like,31 the
extent of protection cannot be diminished. This is in contrast to, let
us say, a moral reading of the Constitution, 32 where, depending on
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CI. L Rv. 1175 (1989).
Id. at 1176.
Id. at 1176-78.
Id. at 1178.
Id. at 1182.

30.

SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 41-47.

31. In fact, rights protection may be more comprehensive in many cases under an
originalist methodology. Under an originalist interpretation, the clauses of the Bill of Rights,
perhaps absolute in character, may provide much greater protection than is usually assumed.
In other words, whereas under nonoriginalism a person's rights may be overcome by a
compelling state interest, an original meaning interpretation would preserve the presumably
absolute character of the rights in question.
32. For a moral reading of the Constitution see DWORKIN, supra note 1. Dworkin is
criticized for the indeterminacy of his moral reading, and for the apparent conflict between
Dworkin's adherence to a moderate form of originalism and his emphasis on the "best"
interpretation of the Constitution. See Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in
JudicialReview: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "MoralReading" of the Constitution,65
FORDHAm L REV. 1269 (1997).

2002

"Religion" in the First Amendment

the particular philosopher/judge on the bench, individual rights may
broaden or narrow. For example, one need only look to cases
where restrictions on contracts were upheld, thus diminishing the
protection afforded property and personal autonomy in the pursuit
of greater social justice.3 Nonetheless, if property and contract
rights are not modern preferred personal rights entitled to greater
constitutional protection, one must examine the case of Maryland
v. Craig,3 where the Court held that the absolutist language of the
Sixth Amendment allowed an accuser to testify via television, and
35
not face-to-face.
Other writers have argued for other normative values that may
underlie originalism and thus make it the most legitimate theory of
constitutional interpretation. For example, Professor Randy Barnett
advances the "writtenness" of the Constitution, and the values that
that characteristic entails, to present a theory of adherence to the
text of the Constitution.3 The obligation to obey the Constitution's
text, for Barnett, derives from the just procedures established by
37
the Constitution's text.
Judge Bork seeks to restrain judges from imposing their view of
good public policy on society and to instead have judges only
overturn the preferences of the people and their representatives
when the Constitution so requires. 38 Bork discusses the Madisonian
dilemma and the tension between the right of the majority to order
its life and the rights of minorities, which the Constitution
protects.m Bork finds that both the majority and minority are
self-interested and are not worthy of trust to properly define the
sphere reserved to each. 40 Consequently, to retain legitimacy, the
Supreme Court must, when arbitrating disputes between the
majority and minority, apply principles neutrally derived from the
Constitution so as not to impose subjective beliefs of good public
33.
34.
35.
36.

See Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
497 U.S. 836 (1990).
Id. at 860.
See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loy. L REv. 611

(1999).

37. Id. at 640-43. The "writtenness" of the Constitution matters to Barnett because its
performs "evidentiary, cautionary, . . . channeling" and "clarification" functions. Id. at
630-36. To deviate from the meaning attached to the text at the time the text was given
authority would be to detract from the value of its "writtenness." Id. at 634.
38.

ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEmPTNG OF AMERICA: THE POimCAL SEDucION OF THE LAW 1

(1990) [hereinafter BORK, TEmPNG].
39. Id. at 139-41.
40. Id. at 139.
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policy.4' Bork then claims that because we will not give total
control over society to the judiciary, judicial power must somehow
be limited.42 Society must limit the power of the judiciary or
subject itself to rule by Platonic guardians. 43 Alternatively, if we do
not retain an independent branch capable of delineating the power
of the government over the individual, we may as well submit to
pure majoritarianism. 44 Since neither alternative is acceptable,
originalism offers the sole remaining theory entailing neutral
principles by which the Court can restrain itself and still protect
individual rights and the right of the majority to rule itself.45
A short but intriguing piece by professor John 0. McGinnis
claims that since the original Constitution was "premised on a
46
correct view of essentially immutable aspects of human nature"
and thus creates the "principles and structure[s]" of government
that most closely align with human nature, the Constitution should
be interpreted in accord with the original meaning. 4v Since the
Framers correctly adduced human nature and created a
government that accordingly fit well with that nature, allowing man
to best pursue happiness, the original Constitution should guide
interpretation. 48 The original Constitution recognizes, McGinnis
argues, that in the private sphere man's self-interest should be
given free reign and accordingly does so. 49 In the public sphere, on
the other hand, because man's self-interest would cause net harm
to society (created by public action problems), it was contained by
a Constitution that harnesses faction, places self-interest against
self-interest, and uses federalism, bicameralism and separation of
powers to raise the costs of exercising control over the entire
government. 50 With the validation of the view of human nature as
not infinitely malleable through government,5' but instead consisting of inherited characteristics, a Constitution which recognizes
41. Id. at 140-41.
42. Id. at 141.
43. BORK, TEMPTYNG, supra note 38, at 141. See also LEARNED HAND, THE BiL. OF RIGns
73-74 (1958).
44. Id.
45.

Id.

46.
47.

Namely, a self-interested nature.
John 0. McGinnis, The Original Constitution and Our Origins, 19 HARv. J.L &

PUB. POL'Y 251 (1996).

48. Id. at 252.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 253-54.
51. Which was the Soviet's view and is the current basis for the liberal obsession with
government programs.
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this self-interest is best suited to govern.5 2
One argument not made, but applicable, is the argument from
intertemporal equality. If the content of the law and the extent of
constitutional protection afforded rights changes, then some
litigants are receiving protection and some are not, even if the
litigants are identical in all respects save the date they sought
Supreme Court review. As a result, nonoriginalism, with its
changing standard as to what qualifies, for example, as a
constitutional right, leads to unequal treatment by the judiciary.
Originalism, by maintaining the same content of protections
afforded citizens, is not open to the same criticism from equality,
ironically a value usually presumed the prerogative of
nonoriginalists.

Proponents of originalism make numerous arguments for original
meaning interpretation. Most rely on ideas about popular
sovereignty (legitimacy), stability, the rule of law, and a few others
scattered in the academic literature. The assertions are powerful
because all the values put forward by originalists are necessary for
a successful government. A government built on something other
than popular sovereignty, Plato's Republic, is not democratic.
Instability would threaten not only business and the economic
success of our nation, but the personal lives of our citizens. If the
content and extent of our rights and duties change very often, how
is one to function? In addition, if it appears to the average citizen
that the Court is simply making-up rights, respect for the Court and
the Constitution would fail. Also, building on the stability argument,
the rule of law virtues of notice, certainty, and rules made by the
people's representatives are threatened when relatively isolated
judges make law. Finally, as briefly alluded to, originalism avoids
the problem of unequal treatment of litigants that nonoriginalism,
with its ever-changing standards invites. In sum, it appears that
originalists offer many normative values to support their adherence
to the original meaning of the text of the Constitution.
B. Arguments Against Nonoriginalism
The arguments against a nonoriginalist interpretative methodology used by originalists are numerous. Clearly, one must ask,
by what standard is the judge, who is unconstrained by originalism,
supposed to decide what the Constitution means?53 With originalism
52.

McGinnis, supra note 47, at 256-59.

53.

SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 44-47.
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the answer, at least theoretically, is relatively simple; what did the
text mean at the time it was ratified? For the nonoriginalist
however, the principle, or lack thereof, by which the meaning of
the Constitution is ascertained is idiosyncratic in that each judge
applies his personal philosophy of the Good and what the
Constitution should mean to the case at hand.14 The nonoriginalist
judge must offer some basis for imposing his will upon the rest of
55
the nation.
Secondly, originalists question the necessity of nonoriginalism in
the first place. The general claim by nonoriginalists is that the
Constitution must change with the times, that it must reflect
contemporary morality. 56 If society really had changed as much as
nonoriginalists claim, why would the less responsive Supreme
Court have to intervene? One would assume that the more
representative legislatures would act first from the assumed
pressure that would arise from the changed society. Similarly, if
one notes the nonoriginalist cases over the last fifty years, they
include many instances where there was no majority popular will
for the decision. 57 Thus, originalists argue the claim that the
Constitution must change to meet the times is merely a cover for a
more liberal agenda that cannot win in the legislatures and must
resort to that branch of government more attune to the agenda.
Building on the previous point, many advocates of nonoriginalism
seek to cabin the scope of influence of elected representatives to
further values supported by the nonoriginalists. Ronald Dworkin,
54. See Henry P Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L REV. 353 (1981)
(criticizing nonoriginalists as wishing to impose their own personal view of what the
Constitution should be, and passing their personal preferences off as constitutional
imperative).
55. Ronald Dworkin offers the most compelling and coherent case for what is termed a
moderate originalism but, as previously discussed, his open-ended invitation to judges to
impose their own philosophical view of what is morally just in a case is open to the same
criticism as other nonoriginalist claims. If only the Dworkinian judges could assure the
nation that their moral views were correct, all would rest assured that justice was being
done.
56. See e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States:
Contemporary Ratification (1985) in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, ORIGINAL

MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK, App. H (1987); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Equality
Principle in American ConstitutionalJurisprudence,48 OIo ST. LJ. 921 (1987); William J.
Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View from the Court,
100 HARv. L REv. 313 (1986).
57. If one notes, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), and even the recent Vermont case, Baker v.
Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (1999), requiring the legalization of homosexual unions, in each
instance the courts took a nonoriginalist approach, without the populace clamoring for the
change, and introduced a new rule of constitutional law.
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for instance, seeks to use the Equal Protection Clause, and the
"abstract moral principle" it contains, to reinforce democracy
"properly understood."- Thus, judges must ensure that all citizens
are treated with "equal concern and respect," as is demanded by
the Fourteenth Amendment. 59 In effect, Dworkin seeks to prevent
the legislatures of the nation6° from not treating all with equal
concern and respect. Never mind that what sounds nice and
acceptable to all in principle is impossible to specify a priori, and
thus judges are again imposing their own views of what equal
concern and respect entails. In other words, since the definition
and scope of "equal concern and respect" is infinitely malleable, the
Dworkinean judge is able to give, as content to the principle of
"equal concern and respect," his personal, subjective belief of the
good. The goal of nonoriginalists in this instance is to prevent the
more popular branches from violating the nonoriginalists' view of
what a democracy is, "properly understood."
Briefly, nonoriginalists advance arguments to avoid application of
the original meaning of the Constitution's text. Under scrutiny,
these arguments fail. Nonoriginalists offer no transparent, neutral
standard by which to judge constitutional litigation. Secondly, the
claim that in a changing society originalism is too static ignores the
reality that the values advocated by nonoriginalists are often
themselves not supported by society, but only by the courts.
C. Proposal of This Article to Ground Originalism in the Just
State
This Article seeks to offer another basis or foundation for
original meaning interpretation. The most difficult aspect of
justifying originalism is to show that people alive today owe
allegiance, and are obliged to obey, the original meaning of the
Constitution, but not the meaning of the Constitution as it has been
interpreted away from that original meaning. The prior arguments
in support of originalism are all open to the same objection; why
not do justice in each instance? 6' In essence, this Article asserts
58. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 7-8. In one sense, then, Dworkin is an originalist because
he claims to ground his interpretative theory in the text of the Constitution. Id. The
principles he abstracts, however, are so ethereal that they contain no guiding principle as to
what, in a concrete situation, is equal, and each judge will presumably have a different
reading of what equality requires. Beyond these quibbles, however, one is forced to ask how
a judge is to abstract a principle from the Constitution (and how far to abstract), and at
what point the judge's search for a moral principle becomes so abstract that the judge is not
really maintaining the fidelity to the Constitution that Dworkin requires. See Michael W.
McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald
Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution, 65 FoRDtsM L REV. 1269 (1997).
59. DWORKEN, supra note 1, at 8.
60. Actually, Dworkin seeks to prevent all government actors, down to the local
garbage man, from treating citizens with a lack of equal concern and respect.
61. While the objection sounds and is totally unpractical, it does reveal the inadequacy
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that original meaning interpretationis required of judges because
it leads to the just state.62 The prior objection, that justice is not
done, is eliminated because original meaning interpretation leads to
the just state, one to which any reasonable person would be
obliged to obey, and a state which all, including judges, are morally
required to bring about.6 Without writing a summa of constitutional
interpretation, the length a full exposition for the arguments briefly
presented here would require, this Article will offer an outline to
be fleshed-out in the future.
The just state is the minimalist state. The minimalist state is the
state that provides protection for its citizens' rights without
violating the rights of anyone. 64 This of course assumes that all
persons have rights and that these rights are inviolable for any
reason. 65 The minimalist state, then, is circumscribed in its just
sphere of operation to the protection of rights from foreign and
domestic rights violators. The state wields the executive power,
delegated to it by the citizens of the state to escape the state of
nature and obtain the benefits of a civil society.6
of supporting an interpretative theory with one or a couple of normative values. The
objection also reveals the power of Dworkin's theory of a moral reading, where the judge
would attempt to do justice in each instance in the descriptive confines of the Constitution.
62. This Article does not make the claim that this justification for originalism is in any
way definitive. As with all political theory, a final answer is never achieved, but hopefully
this grounding of originalism in the just state will advance interpretative theories towards a
more morally correct interpretative theory. The basis for this Article argued that the original
meaning of the Constitution would lead to a minimalist state (or at least one that is more
minimalist) and that the original meaning national government was such a minimalist state.
In addition, it is assumed that the minimalist state is the just state. Finally, the argument
made is based on the claim that what a reasonable person would be obliged to obey, does in
fact obligate all persons regardless of consent or any other act of the will.
63. Judges are included in the group that is required to bring about just institutions
and are thus obliged to use original meaning interpretation to resurrect the just state.
64. ROBERT NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA at ix (1974) [hereinafter Nozic,
ANARCHY].

65. Rights are thus viewed as side constraints on society and the government (and
other men). See id. at 29-35. Rights originate, depending on whom you ask- depending on
the theorists asked- either from God or from the fact that man naturally has control over
his body. Locke begins his analysis of rights finding that God creates all men equally free,
with no man given dominion over another. JOHN LocKE, Two TREATissS ON GOVERNMENT §§ 4,
54 (Peter Laslett ed. 1967) (hereinafter LocKE, GOVERNMENT]. See also id. § 87 ("Man being
born . . . with a Title to perfect Freedom, and an uncontrouled enjoyment of all the Rights
and Priviledges of the Law of Nature, equally with any other Man . . . hath by Nature a
Power... to preserve his Property, that is, his Life, Liberty and Estate .... .").
The extent of one's rights is determined by the labor theory of appropriation for both
Locke and Nozick, see LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra §§ 27-28, but for Locke there is the added
constraint against rights violators that persons cannot violate the natural law. For Nozick the
only constraint is simply his theory of rights as being inherent and natural to man and
inviolable.
66. See NozicK, ANARCHY, supra note 64, at 113-15 (describing the evolution of the just
state as a private association to which individuals delegated their executive power, which is
the power to punish); LocKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 65, §§ 87, 89 (asserting that when men
enter into civil society they delegate their power to punish to a presumably unbiased judge
of rights violations).
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The minimalist state is justified in taxing its citizens for the
protection of every citizen's rights. In pursuit of preventing rights
violations the state can take all necessary steps that do not
themselves violate rights. For example, the just state would create
laws and adjudicate disputes concerning contracts, and the state
would then be morally justified in enforcing its decision as to the
rights of the disputants. The state could also prevent restrictions on
the rights of persons to transact business and commerce.6 In sum,
restrictions on personal autonomy and the ability of persons to act
as they please so long as the rights of others are not violated
would be eliminated by the just national state in its sphere of
sovereignty.
All persons have an obligation to uphold and bring about just
institutions. In his landmark, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls
argues for his two principles of justice, and in doing so establishes
that persons are obligated to obey and bring about just institution
"irrespective of [their] voluntary acts, performative or otherwise."69
In fact, Rawls asserts, "the most important natural duty is to
support and to further just institutions."70 Thus, if the society or
government is just, and applies to71the man in question, that man is
obliged to uphold that institution.
When leaving the state of nature the rational man would choose
that state which protects his rights and the rights of his fellows,
knowing that an offense against the rights of one is an attack on
the rights of all.7 2 Persons choose the just, minimalist state, for
67. This may include defining further those rights retained by the citizens vis-a-vis the
government. Thus, a national government that creates a criminal justice system to better
enable the government to protect the rights of its citizens, may specify the due process
rights of accused. The government may also specify what punishment will fit what crime and
what, exactly, is a crime or rights violation.
68. Here I have in mind the Commerce Clause, as originally understood.
69. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 294 (rev. ed. 1999). See also A. JOHN SIMONS,
MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION 147 (1979) (agreeing with Rawls that all have an
obligation to bring about just institutions). Simmons does not agree, however, that we are
obligated to obey just institutions merely because they "apply" to us absent some act of our
own that would bind us. Id. at 148-52. Simmons's objections are not that persons do not owe
obedience to just institutions, but that such a claim cannot be the basis of political
obligation because all would owe a duty of obedience to all just institutions regardless of
their nationality. Id. at 154-56. One could argue in response to Simmons that while we may
owe allegiance to all just institutions, we can practically support just institutions while in our
own country, and not oppose the creation of just institutions abroad. See Jeremy Waldron,
Special Ties and Natural Duties, 22 PHIuL & PUB. AFFAIRS 3, 27 (1993). As a result, the
obedience owed just institutions can be the basis of political obligation as discussed in this
Article.
70. PAwLs, supra note 69, at 293. Rawls argues that the just state that will be
supported is the state that adheres to his two principles of justice. Id. at 295. Contrary to
Rawl's assumption, if the just state is the minimalist state, then regardless of the principles
of justice one is still obligated to the just state.
71. Id.
72. LOCKE, GOVERNMENT supra note 65, § 88. In the state of nature, any individual could
punish for transgressions of the natural law no matter who the victim. See id. §§ 6, 8.
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their own and the protection of others' rights since all know that
without choosing to live under the just institution each is worse off
73
as each is the judge in his own case concerning rights violations.
Consequently, for each person's own well being, and the well being
of others, the rational person seeks to support existing just
institutions, but also seeks to bring about the existence of just
institutions.
The state envisioned by the Constitution, properly interpreted
using original meaning interpretation, is the minimalist, just state.
We forget today, in an era of unrestrained and unenumerated
powers, that the federal government was originally one of very few
and limited powers with likewise limited purposes. 74 Hamilton
argued in Federalist23 that the:
principle purposes to be answered by the union are these the common defense of the members; the preservation of the
public peace, as well against internal convulsions as external
attacks; the regulation of commerce with other nations and
between the States; the superintendence of our
intercourse,
75
political and commercial, with foreign countries.
Thus, the national government envisioned by Hamilton was one of
protecting the rights of the citizens of the states and of facilitating
the expression of those rights through the protection of commerce
and other national activities. The national government was also
one, first and foremost, of limited enumerated powers. 76 The
powers delegated to the national government were for the purpose
of effecting national goals, in the most efficient manner, so as not
to give the national government more authority than was
necessary.7 7 Furthermore, the Necessary and Proper Clause
conferred only those powers that, in the words of Hamilton, "would
have been implied by necessity absent the Clause," and thus did
not grant anything more than the ability to achieve the national
government's limited goals. Consequently, the Necessary and
Proper Clause did not make the national government
73. Id. §§ 77, 87.
74. See Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA L REv.
1387 (1987) (discussing the structural and substantive constraints on the national
government including the enumeration of powers).
75. THE FEDERLIST No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton).
76. See e.g., FoeRRsT McDONALD, Novus ORno SECLORUM, 202-03, 206, 262-63 (1985)
(discussing the importance of and impetus for enumeration of powers); THE FEDERALIST Nos.
41-44 (James Madison) (supporting the view of a limited national government through
enumerated powers by discussing the enumerated powers).
77. TiE FEDERALIST No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating "[tihe necessity of a
Constitution, at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the preservation of the
Union is the point at the examination of which we are now arrived"). The Congress retained
the powers it possessed under the Articles and was delegated ten additional powers.
McDoNALD, supra note 76, at 262-63. The Constitution explicitly reaffirmed the limited scope
of the delegation to Congress in the Tenth Amendment.
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non-minimalist.7 8
The national government was given the power over, as Madison
stated: "1. Security against foreign danger; 2. Regulation of the
intercourse with foreign nations; 3. Maintenance of harmony and
proper intercourse among the States; 4. Certain miscellaneous
objects of general utility; 5. Restraint of the States from certain
injurious acts; [and] 6. Provisions for giving due efficacy to all
these powers." 9 In sum, the national government was given the
ability to protect rights from foreign and domestic threat8 0 and to
assist persons in transacting business. If one looks through Article
I, Section 8, one will find that the Congress was given the authority
to create the necessary background environment so that market
transactions would be able to flourish. The power to regulate
commerce, coin money, promote industry, and to punish those that
interfered with the market81 through counterfeiting and piracy, are
indicative of this purpose.
Nevertheless, the power to "raise and support armies" may raise
difficulties for the proposition that the originalist state was a
minimalist state 82 In one sense, to require persons to defend the
state may amount to involuntary servitude, that one labor for the
benefit of another. On the other hand, by giving the state the
executive -power, that is, the authority to protect rights from
transgression by foreigners, the state will need persons to fill, for
example, the Army. It appears that if the state purchases the labor
of individuals willing to sell their labor in the form of serving in the
military, there is no transgression of rights. Thus, with the qualifier
that the military consist of volunteers only, the power of the
national government to raise and support armies is not inconsistent
with, and is indeed required by, the minimalist state. 83 This qualifier
may be unnecessary if one is persuaded that all in the just state
have to provide their fair share towards the costs of maintaining its
rights protections. Consequently, since the state may "force" its
citizens to pay taxes for the rights-protecting mechanisms in the
state, in effect taking their labor without their consent, the state
may also be justified in requiring that some of its citizens directly
donate their labor to the military.
Amendments to the Constitution do not pose a problem for a
minimalist state hypothesis, except, perhaps, the national income
tax provided for in the Sixteenth Amendment. This is because of
78. In Federalist 44 Madison defends the Convention's use of the Necessary and
Proper Clause as necessary if the new national government was to be able to accomplish the
many goals that the People were to entrust to it. THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison).
79. TiH FEDERA IsT No. 41 (James Madison).
80. Within the sphere of the national government's authority, of course.
81. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8.
82. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
83. Whether this reservation is the original meaning of the Constitution is not clear.
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the unrestrained use of the taxes raised for purposes other than the
protection of rights or facilitation of voluntary exchange. Were tax
revenues used only for the enforcement of rights protection and to
facilitate the exercise of rights through the enumerated powers in
Article I, the rights of none would be violated and no objection
would be raised. Indeed, most of the amendments to the
Constitution do not expand the power of the national government
in the sense that they allow the national government to regulate its
citizens unjustly. On the contrary, the amendments in the Bill of
Rights are declarations of rights that the national government
cannot interfere with, and many other amendments simply define
the positive rights of citizens4 and clarify the structure or workings
of the government. 85 The Civil War Amendments prevent rights
violations by the states. Taken together, the amendments to the
Constitution do not expand the authority of the national
government so as to infringe on individual's rights, but merely
define rights or seek to protect rights.
In summary, the original meaning of the national government
was of a minimalist state. The minimalist national government
would protect and define rights within its sphere of supremacy and
facilitate the exercise of those rights. There is little or no evidence
that runs counter to a thesis that the national government, as
originally intended, was nonminimalist.
Nonoriginalist interpretation has led to the emasculation of the
purpose of enumerating powers for the national government. In
other words, interpretative methods other than originalism have led
to a state that is not minimalist, as envisioned by the Founders, but
is instead large and bureaucratic, and have thus allowed the
creation of a state that infringes upon the rights of its citizens. For
example, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,8 when combined
7 has led to
with the aggregation analysis of Wickard v. Filburn,8
the unprecedented and uncabined power of Congress under the
title of the Commerce Clause.8 The spending power has also been
9 the
stretched beyond recognition. In United States v. Butler,8
Court ruled that Congress could spend its largess on anything it
wished so long as the spending promoted the "general welfare." 90
The spending power was not limited to Congress's enumerated
powers, and Congress could in fact achieve what would otherwise
be prohibited to it through its spending power by enticing states to
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
national
89.
90.

Such as the 19th Amendment.
Like the 12th Amendment.
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
See Epstein, supra note 74 (detailing the failure of the structural constraints on the
government, especially under the guise of the Commerce Clause).
297 U.S. 1 (1936).
Butler, 297 U.S. at 65-66.
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accept federal money with strings 1 Consequently, there is no area
of life today that is theoretically off limits to the national
government's power. The national government has become one of
unlimited power, infringing upon rights in all manner of situations.
With it established that original meaning interpretation can lead
to the minimalist state, which is the just state, one question
remains: what to do in a situation when original meaning
interpretation would not lead to more rights being protected and
defined? For instance, what of rights defined against the federal
government under the doctrine of substantive due process? The
problem can be confronted in multiple ways. One is to deny that
such rights declarations make a difference to the just state analysis.
With a minimalist state that does not have the authority to violate
rights, natural rights are not in jeopardy and would not be violated
in any case, so such a definition of rights would be superfluous.
Another approach, which is the approach this Article will take, is
to argue that the interpretative methodology of original meaning
leads to the just minimalist state except, perhaps, in a few narrow
instances. Since original meaning interpretation is generally correct,
judges should not be permitted to vary from its methodology
because the use of nonoriginalism can lead to results other than
the just state. In other words, with originalism generally coming to
the correct conclusion, more harm is wrought through the use of
nonoriginalism than there is good gained in the specific instance.
As a result, if a judge comes upon a situation where a
nonoriginalist methodology may lead to the defining of more rights
as against the state, the judge should adhere to the original
92
meaning.
Judges with the ability or moral scruples to apply a nonoriginalist methodology in situations where they feel nonoriginalism
leads to the morally just results would undermine the legitimacy of
the judiciary and decrease stability in the law. If the public9 viewed
judges as contravening an interpretative methodology that yielded
consistently just results on the basis of the judges' own
philosophical inkling of what is just in a given situation, the
public's view of the judiciary as adhering to the law and striving for
the just result could falter. Judges who feel unconstrained by a
general methodology and who resort to nonoriginalism when they
believe the situation warrants, undermine stability in the law by
making the law hinge on each judge's concept of the Good.
91. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
92. If the original meaning in an instance would lead to an injustice, the amendment
process is available to correct the fault. Then judges addressing problem cases where the
amendment addresses the prior unjust situation would be required to apply the original
meaning of the amendment.
93. Public can be defined as the general populace or more specifically as the legal
community, who would believe originalism to be the only just interpretative methodology.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 40:181

Therefore, if judges frequently enough are faced with situations
where they feel that the just outcome is different from what the
prevailing originalist theory would deliver (not unlikely) and resort
to other methods of decision, that would result in less stability of
the law and consequently a diminution of the security of rights.
With the extent of the government governed by the original
meaning, the extent of rights protections should be construed in
like manner. It would be incongruent to read parts of the
Constitution differently. The original meaning governs the extent of
the government and its ability to carry out the mandate of the just
state. When that mandate comes into conflict with another section
of the same founding document, that other section must be
construed in like manner so the entire document, and the
government created by the document, can fulfill its purpose.
Originalism, as we have seen, is the only moral interpretative
methodology.9 4 The foundation for originalism given in this Article
is the just state. The state that does not violate rights is the
legitimate state to which all owe obedience. Since original meaning
interpretation leads to the just state, all are morally required to use

originalism.
D.

The Necessity of Applying the Original Meaning of Religion
Today

With it established that the original meaning of the text of the
Constitution is authoritative, this Article will turn to the impact of
an originalist interpretation of "religion" on the Court's jurisprudence. Assuming, as will be shown in the next Part of this
Article, that the original meaning of religion is of a belief system in
one God, with concomitant duties towards God, and a future state
of rewards and punishments, the courts of the United States are
morally obliged to reject their recent jurisprudence that has drifted
far from the shores of original meaning jurisprudence.
As in other contexts, the First Amendment, and especially
questions concerning whether a belief system qualifies for
protection as a religion, pose an opportunity for both originalist
and nonoriginalist interpretation. As a hypothetical, assume that
there is a belief system that clearly does not fit the original
meaning of the Constitution, perhaps neo-Platonism. For nonoriginalists judges, the hypothetical poses all of the problems of
indeterminacy, the lack of a standard or neutral principle by which
94. There are, perhaps, other methodologies that would lead to the just state, but they
would not have the benefit of being relatively clear and stable in their application. In
addition, such nonoriginalist methodologies could potentially lead to all of the
aforementioned ills brought about by nonoriginalism. In sum, any other methodology does
not have the normative benefits (outside of producing the just state), while potentially
acquiring the deficiencies of nonoriginalism.
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to judge the case, and how the neutral principle is derived and
from what source that nonoriginalism poses in all contexts. The
values advanced by originalism, including stability, rule of law
values, democratic theory (including the legitimacy of the
judiciary), rights protection, and equality are also imperiled by
resort to nonoriginalism. Litigants do not know if the First
Amendment protects their belief system and the lack of stability
entailed by this uncertainty forces them to lead their lives in ways
they otherwise would not.
In addition, there is no notice of whether there will be a change
in the Court's jurisprudence because of the indeterminacy that
accompanies the lack of visible and widely accepted standard in
nonoriginalism. The populace will question whether the judiciary is
legitimate when it seems that litigants prevail or fail based on some
unknown standard that originates from nowhere other than the
judge's bosom. Finally, the ability of courts to change the content
of what is protected by the First Amendment, this time including
neo-Platonism under the rubric of religion, certainly seems to
indicate that the same institution can, in another case, decide that
Anglicanism is not protected as a religion. In sum, all of the values
put forward by originalist writers are implicated in the context of
religion in the First Amendment.
Of course, the theory advanced by this Article, that original
meaning interpretation is morally required, also powerfully leads to
the conclusion that a neo-Platonist should not receive the
protection of the Free Exercise Clause. The context of religion
could lead to an instance where one would be tempted to apply a
nonoriginalist methodology and find neo-Platonism to be covered
as a religion. Firstly, in the minimalist state with enumerated power
as envisioned, the government would theoretically have no power
to infringe on religious freedom. This assumption is wrong.
Presumably, there could be some religious belief system that
prevented its adherents from paying taxes in any form, even if the
taxes are to be justly used to support the rights protecting
mechanisms of the state. As we have seen, the just state is the only
state that is morally justified in requiring its citizens to pay the
costs of protecting their rights. Consequently, the state is justified
in requiring persons who religiously object to paying any taxes to
either pay taxes or be punished.
If the neo-Platonist's claim is not so radical in that he simply
wants an exemption from a law that infringes on his religious
beliefs, 95 the judge must still follow the original meaning of the
Constitution. Since originalism leads to the just state, the
methodology must be applied in all instances. If originalism were
95.

For example, the neo-Platonist may be a conscientious objector.
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applied only when the judge believed the result to be just, the
benefits of originalism and the just state would not arise. In other
words, with originalism being the morally best interpretative
theory, it should be applied in all instances.
While in the individual instance the denial of protection to the
neo-Platonist may appear unjust, when the entire document of the
Constitution and the rights-protecting apparatus is viewed, the
same interpretative methodology must apply. Thus, for the
minimalist government to carry out its assigned functions, when
that government conflicts with claims other than those envisioned
by the original meaning, those claims must give way to the
necessary function of the state.
In sum, the normative values underlying originalism, when
included with the just state basis of originalism advanced in this
Article, require application of the original meaning of the word
religion in the First Amendment.
Ill.
A.

MODERN DEFINITIONS OF RELIGION IN JURISPRUDENCE

JurisprudentialViews

Prior to the 1890 case, Davis v. Beason,96 the Supreme Court had
not explicitly addressed the meaning of religion in the Constitution.
In Davis the Court stated that "the term 'religion' has reference to
one's views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations
they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of
obedience to his wil." 97 Essentially, the Court used a theistic view
of religion, the same view proffered by this Article as the original
meaning. 98 This theistic view held sway in the Court's jurisprudence
96. 133 U.S. 333 (1890). In the 1815 case, Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. 43 (1815), Joseph
Story, speaking for the Court, tangentially discussed religion when dealing with a
controversy over the land held by the disestablished Episcopal Church. Justice Story took a
stance on establishment that would allow the states to aid all religions equally. Id. at 48-49.
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance was quoted by Story to the effect that "religion can
be directed only by reason and conviction," but that did not mean, Story wrote, that the
citizens' free exercise is restrained "by aiding with equal attention the votaries of every sect
to perform their own religious duties . . . ." Id.
97. Davis, 133 U.S. at 342. In the earlier Mormon polygamy case of Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 162-63 (1878), the Court found that the "word 'religion' is not defined in
the Constitution. We must go elsewhere, therefore, to ascertain its meaning, and nowhere
more appropriately, we think, than to the history of the times in the midst of which the
provision was adopted." In a later case, The Late Corporationof the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890), the Court took the Davis definition
one step further. The Supreme Court required that any practice claimed to be religious, to be
considered religious for constitutional purposes, must not itself be "against the enlightened
sentiment of mankind, notwithstanding the pretence of religious conviction by which they
may be advocated and practiced." Id. at 50. In other words, any practice claimed to be
religious, while arguably motivated by religious-type sentiments, must meet a certain level of
enlightenment to be considered religious.
98. As the minimum or broadest original meaning definition.
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up to the 1940s. 99
The Second Circuit began the shift away from the Supreme
Court's earlier theistic definition of religion to one that was at once
more expansive and less clearly defined. In United States v.
Kauten,1°° Judge Augustus Hand defined religion thus:
Religious belief[10 1] arises from a sense of the inadequacy of
reason as a means of relating the individual to his fellow-men
and to his universe ... It is a belief finding expression in a
conscience which categorically requires the believer to
disregard elementary self-interest and to accept martyrdom in
preference to transgressing its tenets...
[It] may justly be regarded as a response of the
individual to an inward mentor, call it conscience or God, that
is for many persons at the present time the equivalent
of what
10 2
has always been thought a religious impulse.
The definition contains much of what many would consider
characteristics of a religion including the use of faith as opposed to
reason, willingness to martyr oneself, and intensity of belief.
Religion is not seen, however, as just the relation of a man to his
God, but can now encompass man's relation to others and the
greater truths of this life and universe. In essence, the Hand
definition relied upon analogy to belief systems readily accepted as
religions. Analogy to established religions was used to help define
religion in the case at hand - is the psychological impact on the
believer ' in.
this instance similar to the impact in a traditional
believer? 03
The Supreme Court, in a case involving mail fraud, implicitly
expanded beyond theism the definition of religion.' °4 The
defendants in United States v. Ballard0 5 were accused of
defrauding others through the mails when they claimed they could
heal disease. 1°6 The Court ruled that the jury was properly
precluded from examining the truth of the defendants' claims
stating that:
99. See United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1932) (Hughes, C.J.,
dissenting) (stating that "[tihe essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving
duties superior to those arising from any human relation").
100. 133 F2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
101. Religious belief being merely belief in a belief system that qualifies as a religion.
102. Kauten, 133 F2d at 708.
103. Admittedly, the Second Circuit was interpreting the meaning of the religious
exemption in the Selective Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 885 (current version
at 50 U.S.C. §463 (2000)), but the definition was groundbreaking nonetheless.
104. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
105. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
106. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 80.
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Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious
belief, is basic in a society of free men. It embraces the right
to maintain theories of life and of death and of the hereafter,
which are rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths...
Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be
put to proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious
experiences, which are as real as life to some, may be
incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that they may be
beyond the ken of mortals does not mean that they can be
07
made suspect before the law.
In other words, "religion" does not necessarily have to include
belief in a deity, and the bounds encompassed under the rubric of
religion were expanded yet further to include almost anything. 08
In 1961 the High Court further expanded the definition of
religion. In Torcaso v. Watkins,' °9 the Court struck down a
centuries-old requirement of the Maryland Constitution that
required all office holders to declare a belief in a God." 0 The
definition of religion under the Establishment Clause was said to
embrace belief and disbelief, religion and nonreligion, theistic and
nontheistic beliefs, which included secular humanism."' Now firmly
unmoored from its basis in the text of the First Amendment and
history, 112 the meaning of religion was free to extend the
protections of the Free Exercise Clause to acts motivated by any
"moral" belief.
The context of conscientious objectors offered to the Court
ample opportunity to extend the reach of religion. In United States
v. Seeger,13 the Court construed the congressional requirement of a
belief in a "Supreme Being" to mean:
whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies
107. Id. at 86-87 (citation omitted).
108. See also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (quoting from Kauten's expansive language concerning religion). The Court's
unrestrained dicta in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947), also committed the
Court to an expansive reading of religion in the Establishment Clause context to include
both "belief" and "disbelief" under the heading of religion. Understanding religion to include
disbelief is hardly intuitive since religion is generally deemed to include a belief in
something. See MERRiAM-WBsTEr's COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 988 (10th ed. 1993) (defining
religion generally as a devotion to some belief).
109. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
110. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 496.
111. Id. at 495..
112. As will be shown in Part IV.
113. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by
orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for
exemption. Where such beliefs have parallel positions in
lives of their respective holders we cannot say that one is
14
a relation to a Supreme Being" and the other is not.'

the
the
the
"in

Thus, purportedly to avoid the constitutional question of an
establishment," 5 the Supreme Court ruled that analogy to
traditional religious beliefs would be the guiding light of the
meaning of religion in the First Amendment. 1 6 If one holds beliefs
that are admittedly not religious in the traditional sense, in the
sense the word religion was used by the Ratifiers and Framers of
the First Amendment, the Court will still entitle those beliefs to the
same protection as admittedly religious (or traditional) beliefs. The
Seeger definition is broad enough to protect atheists.
Welsh v. United States"7 offered another opportunity in the
conscientious objector context for the Court to include traditionally
nonreligious beliefs within the meaning of religion. The Welsh Court
ruled that an exemption must be granted to those whose beliefs
were held, as under Seeger, with similar intensity to those of
traditional religious beliefs." 8 Thus, only those beliefs that did "not
rest at all upon moral, ethical, or religious principle but instead
rest[ed] solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or
expediency" were not protected." 9 With the near infinite
malleability of the content of what is "moral" or based on a
"policy," the Court expanded the definition of religion to its farthest
reach, encompassing all belief systems that are strongly held with
only three ill-defined exceptions for beliefs that are pragmatic,
20
expedient or based on policy.
In sum, the Supreme Court radically changed the content of the
religion clauses in the First Amendment. The Court initially
determined religion to encompass theistic beliefs that motivated the
believer in that instance' 2' and has since expanded religion to
114. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166.
115. See id. at 188-93 (Douglas, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 166.
117. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
118. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 342.
119. Id. at 342-43.
120. Unhelpfully, those beliefs labeled pragmatic, expedient and based on policy, are
defined as those objections to war that do "not rest at all upon moral, ethical, or religious
principle.. . ." Id.
121. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
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explicitly include religious and nonreligious, moral, philosophical,
and other strongly held beliefs. 12
B.

Academic Commentary

The academic commentary on the transition to a more
unrestrictive meaning of religion has been favorable. Generally, the
commentators assume that the meaning of religion must change
because of our changing society, and that the change is towards a
more expansive reading. For example, Laurence Tribe, in his much
admired treatise on constitutional law, asserted that while the
definition of religion was "narrowly" defined theistically, the
"changed circumstances" in the form of more religious pluralism
made it "inevitable that the Supreme Court would modify the
narrow understanding of 'religion.'"'12 The "demands of a
definition" of religion required a more expansive view of what a
122. In 1972, the Court faced Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), where it found
that the Free Exercise Clause exempted Amish children above the eighth grade from
Wisconsin's mandatory education laws. In doing so the Supreme Court placed great emphasis
on the theistic nature of the Amish beliefs. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16. The Court found that
"if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the
contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social
values of his time . .. their claims would not rest on a religious basis." Id. at 216. This is
because Thoreau's views were philosophical and not religious, and because nonreligious
(philosophical) belief is not protected by the "Religion Clauses." Id. The Court went on to
add that the Amish beliefs are "not merely a matter of personal preference, but one of deep
religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately related to daily living,"
thus implying that the trappings of traditional religion and intensity of belief aid religious
exemption claims. Id.
123. LAURENCE TRIE, 2 CONsTrrUONAL LAw 1179-80 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter 2 TRIBE].
The early article by J. Morris Clark, Guidelinesfor the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARv. L REv.
327 (1969), maintains that any definition that is too narrow, as the original meaning
definition would presumably be, "would mock common usage" by excluding groups many
Americans normally think of as religions. Why this matters is not clearly explained. Would
Clark also claim that since Americans would not normally think of the word "liberty" as
encompassing rights as varied as abortion and to send one's children to private school, that
Roe and Pierce are illegitimate? Clark's answer is to explicitly affirm the Supreme Court as a
philosophical institution, and consequently, the Court should endeavor to protect "compelling
conscientious belief. . . ." Id. at 344. In doing so, the Court must "balance" the individual's
interest in doing what he believes is moral against the state's interest. Id. What weight is to
be given to each interest is not stated, and the whole process is hopelessly vague. Clark
understands that such a definition would protect nontheistic beliefs, but believes nonetheless
that no distinction between theistic and nontheistic beliefs is permissible because of the
threat of an establishment. Id. at 342. In essence, Clark asserts a broad definition of religion
because to do otherwise might establish a religion- but is not that the point in contention?
How can we establish a religion unless we know what a religion is? Clark's assertion boils
down to the claim that by the very act of defining a religion the Court would be establishing
a religion.
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religion was.12 4 Tribe still wanted the definition to exclude some
belief systems, and reviewed the literature to find adequate theories
to form a definition.' 21 In the entire academic literature, a summary
of which will follow, the proponent of a new definition rejected the
original meaning definition as too constrained, and then struggled
to arrive at a. definition that is at once limited but not too
constraining. Where and why the limits are set where they are is
not stated because a principled definition of religion, divorced from
the original meaning, is unattainable.
In the 1978 Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of
Religion, the two principles the religion clauses are said to embody
are voluntarism and separatism. 2 6 Thus, it was asserted by the
author that the Free Exercise Clause was designed to prevent any
direct, or indirect, coercion in matters of conscience. 127 In declaring
the purpose of the religion clauses, the author asserted that the
"views of the Framers offer little guidance in fixing the meaning of
the word 'religion.'"12s Even if there was evidence of the original
meaning, the Note claimed, without stating why, that the meaning
of religion "must evolve as society and its needs change." 2 9 With
regard to an evolving society, the author noted the diversification
of religions and religious groups.'13
The Note then set out to define for itself a proper definition of
religion. 31 Again, the Note stated, without telling us where this core
value arose, that the "core value" of free exercise is "inviolability of
conscience." It then argues that any acceptable definition must be
124. 2 TamE, supra note 123, at 1180.
125. Id. at 1181-82. Tribe discusses definitions by analogy and dismisses those that
"focus on the externalities of a belief system or organization" because the resulting definition
is not sufficiently broad. Id. at 1181. Tibe settles on definitions that work by analogy to the
function religion plays in orthodox believers, as did the Note that follows. Id. at 1182.
126. Note, Toward a ConstitutionalDefinition of Religion, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1056, 1058
(1978).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1060.
129. Id.
130. Id. Such a claim, however, is dubious. The fact that there are more religions and
religious groups does not mean the Founders and Ratiflers were not acquainted with
religions not to be found in the United States, and religions not similar to the untraditional
"religions" of today. Indeed, the United States at the time of the ratification of the First
Amendment was the most religiously plural nation on Earth, with believers of different sects
of Christianity, agnostics, atheists, Jews and native religions. In addition, so long as the
general type of belief systems around today were in existence in 1791, the expanding number
of sects does not matter because the Ratifiers and Framers would have been familiar with
essentially the same form of belief system.
131. Note, 91 HARv. L. REv. at 1072-83.
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broad enough to further the "core value" while at the same time
narrow enough not to encompass all beliefs. 132 The author feared
exclusion of nontraditional "religions" for "parochial reasons," and
consequently argues for a definition based on "inductive reasoning"
or "a priori" indicia of religion.'3
The Note settled on a functional standard that is based on the
"role played by a system of belief in an individual's life and seeks
to identify those functions worthy of preferred status in the
constitutional scheme.""1 This standard includes what are normally
denoted secular or nonreligious beliefs, and essentially restates the
Supreme Court standard iterated in Seeger and Welsh.
In his 1982 Note, The Sacred and the Profane: A First
Amendment Definition of Religion, Timothy Hall assumed that the
original meaning of religion was "well defined and quite narrowly
limited" to traditional theistic beliefs, but then went on to assert
that religion denotes a belief system in which there are both sacred
and profane elements. 35 Hall criticized those definitions that would
encompass within the protection afforded by the Free Exercise
Clause belief systems that are "purely moral, ethical, political or
other 'secular' expressions."13
Like the 1978 Note, Hall's Note sought to navigate between the
shoals of exclusion of "nontraditional" religious belief and include
activity not motivated by "true" religious belief. 37 As a result, Hall
proposed a descriptive definition that would include those
characteristics "common to all persons and groups who experience
what they regard as religion."'3 The meta-characteristic Hall settled
on was the sacred and profane dichotomy: "[a] religion is a unified
system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things ... things
132. Id. at 1072-73. It is the assertion of this Article that any "meaning" of religion
created post hoc is subjective, value laden, and capable of infinite manipulation, while a
definition based on the original meaning of religion serves many purposes, and legitimately
restricts the scope of the word religion. Later the Note's author added a third criteria, that
any acceptable definition cannot contravene a societal consensus on what religion means.
See id. at 1073 n.101. Why a societal consensus on what constitutes a religion cannot
exclude what society would generally not consider a religion (atheism), while at the same
time a societal consensus can assure inclusion of what society considers a religion is not
explained. Surely, the author would not let the values said to be imbedded in the Equal
Protection Clause depend on the whims of society.
133. Id. at 1073.
134. Id. at 1075.
135. Timothy L Hall, Note, The Sacred and the Profane: A First Amendment
Definition of Religion, 61 TFx. L. REv. 139, 154, 159 (1982).
136. Id. at 160.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 161.
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set apart and forbidden . . . which united into one single moral
community called a Church," and those things labeled profane or
natural. 13 Put another way, the sacred aspect of a religion is that
which is "wholly other," or "transcendent," while the profane is that
of the natural world, and each religion contains a belief system into
which this sacred-profane dichotomy is present. The Note claimed
that this descriptive definition has the virtue of being broad enough
to encompass all truly religious belief and actions, while at the
same time narrow enough to exclude philosophical, moral or other
belief systems. 14°
More recently, Andrew Austin proposed a meaning for religion as
belief systems based on faith and a higher power. 4 ' As with the
other commentators discussed, Austin claimed, without providing
any reasoning, that the original meaning of religion is irrelevant
because "it is clear that today the [religion] clauses serve
fundamentally different purposes in our society."le Thus, the
definition for religion Austin proposed to create would be "flexible"
to accommodate societal growth and change.'" For Austin, such a
definition must include all those belief systems that society accepts
as religious,'" the definition must enable courts to decide difficult
cases, and it must not arbitrarily distinguish what is and is not a
religion. 145 Defining religion as a belief system based on faith,146a
139. Id. at 164 (citations ormitted).
140. Note, 61 TEx L REV. at 172-73.
141. Andrew W. Austin, Faith and the ConstitutionalDefinition of Religion, 22 CumB.
L REV. 1 (1991).
142. Id. at 2. Oddly, given the fact that the Framers' society is vastly different from our
own, Austin, when discussing the purposes and principles of the Free Exercise Clause, refers
to the writings of Madison. Id. at 10. See also id. at 40-41 (stating that the Framers' view on
the meaning of religion was "clearly theistic, and would not have protected many of the
individuals that have been granted exemptions under current doctrine"). But why does it
matter that many individuals would not be exempted by the original meaning, if the meaning
does not exempt them? Austin's own definition is intended to exclude some but that does
not detract from the definition unless the exclusion is wrong based on some other normative
criteria Consequently, the exclusion of what Austin believes to be a religion by the original
meaning definition is wrong only if original meaning interpretation itself is wrong.
143. Id. at 6.
144. Id. Why what society thinks the meaning of a word has changed to should change
the meaning of the text of the Constitution is not explained. Presumably, society could view
the "equal" in the Equal Protection Clause more narrowly, thus excluding from its current
protection many groups. In his discussion of the Court's jurisprudence Austin criticized the
Court for creating too expansive a definition that includes beliefs "that in no way resemble
what one would normally consider religion." Id. at 16. One must ask how this admonition
squares with his previous assertion that any acceptable definition of religion must not
exclude unorthodox beliefs. Id.
145. Id.
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system that cannot be proven based on logical reasoning, fits these
criteria for Austin. 147 A belief system that qualifies as a religion,
apparently, is not rational or even, according to Austin, "internally
[]consistent" and thus fits his test.14
Jesse H. Chopper, in his Article, Defining "Religion" in the First
Amendment, put forth a more restrictive content-based definition of
religion. 149 Chopper tailored his definition of religion, like the other
commentators, so as not to "exclude certain beliefs (or groups)
that are reasonably perceived . . . as being religious" because that
may lead to a violation of the Establishment Clause, since one
religion may impermissibly be preferred over another.' 5° Chopper
also expressed his desire that the definition be capable of
expansion to include nontraditional religions.' 5 ' Like the other
commentaries reviewed, Chopper also dismissed resort to the
original meaning because the "ultimate form [of the definition of
religion] must serve purposes beyond the specific visions of the
framers ... "152
Chopper's solution was to define religions in relation to those
belief systems that contain beliefs in "extratemporal
consequences.""1 If a believer is subject to the belief that his
actions, or failure to act, can result in punishment not of this
world, the state cannot legitimately place the believer in a position
to choose between following the dictates of the state or eternal
consequences.15 These necessary, and apparently sufficient, criteria
for a definition of religion are found, Chopper claimed, in the
traditional justifications for a religious exemption and the Free
146. At different times, Austin includes the caveat that the belief based on faith must
be one in a "greater power." Id. at 43.
147. Austin, supra note 141, at 36.
148. Id. at 41-42. See also James M. Donovan, God is as God Does: Law, Anthropology,
and the Definition of "Religion",6 SaroN HALL CONST. LJ. 23 (1995) (attempting to derive a
definition of religion based on insights offered by anthropology). Donovan, after reviewing
the academic literature and federal court jurisprudence, finds that there have been advocated
four types of definitions of religion including: content definitions, behavioral-performative
definitions, mental definitions, and functional definitions. See id. at 70-91. Donovan settles
for a definition that is a "generative functional one." Id. at 95. His proposed definition is "any
belief system which serves the psychological function of alleviating death andety." Id.
149. Jesse H. Chopper, Defining Religion in the First Amendment, 1982 ILL L Rv.
579.
150. Id. at 579-80.
151. Id. at 580.
152. Id. As usual, the reasoning behind this claim is lacking, but this Article assumes
that the same "changing society" arguments confronted before are in play here.
153. Id. at 597-601.
154. Chopper, supra note 149, at 597-601.
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Exercise Clause.'5 The proposed definition, Chopper argued, is
sufficiently broad to contain most recognized religions, while at the
same time excluding those belief systems that are not beyond the
competence of government to control. 15
George C. Freeman took a more radical approach to the
definitional problem and argued that the pursuit of a definition of
religion is flawed in and of itself. 57 Instead of a content-based
definition, like that proposed by Chopper, or a functional definition,
as advocated by the 1978 Harvard Note, Freeman offered a list of
eight characteristics that he claimed all religions possess, though
each religion may not have all characteristics. 1 The pursuit of a
definition is inherently problematic for Freeman because there is
no single essence of religion, no one word or idea or form, in the
Platonic sense, that all belief systems commonly labeled "religions"
have in common, and thus the pursuit of a definition is futile.'Freeman is agnostic concerning the impact of the original
understanding of the definition of religion, but did claim "most of
the Founders equated religion with theism." 16 This is odd because
in the related context of whether "religion" has a similar definition
for both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, Freeman
asserted that any argument against a consistent meaning of religion
must "be accompanied by an argument for why the Founders'
views on the subject should be ignored."' 6' In any event, Freeman
ignored the original meaning of religion, opting instead for a list of
descriptive characteristics of religion that are admittedly
unhelpful. 62
155.

Id. at 598-99.

156. Id. at 599-601.
157. George C. Freeman, 1H, The Misguided Searchfor the ConstitutionalDefinition
of "Religion," 71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983). For another academic claiming that the search for a
definition of religion is itself misguided and impossible, see Anita Bowser, Delimiting
Religion in the Constitution: A Classification Problem, 11 VAL U. L REv. 163 (1977)
(arguing that "[blecause classification cannot be carried on deductively the task is an
inherently arbitrary one") (citation omitted).
158. Freeman, supra note 157, at 1553. The eight categories are:
1. A belief in a Supreme Being 2. A belief in a transcendental reality 3. A moral code
4. A worldview that provides an account of man's role in the universe and around
which an individual organizes his life 5. Sacred rituals and holy days 6. Worship and
prayer 7. A sacred text or scriptures 8. Membership in a social organization that
promotes a religious belief system[.]
Id.
159. Id. at 1152-53.
160. Id. at 1520.
161. Id. at 1524.
162. Id. at 1565.
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The examples of academic commentary all have the same general
flaw in that none give any coherent normative reason as to why
their definition of religion should be chosen. In addition, the
definitions offered the term religion are subjective and muddled.
The authors propose definitions claiming that they do not want to
exclude what is really religion without giving any reasons why or
how, while also claiming that to include too many belief systems
under the precept of religion would be equally wrong. In the end,
having left the safe-harbor of the meaning attributed to the word
religion by the Framers and Ratifiers, academia is unable to arrive
at neutral principles to define religion. 163
In summary, the commentators have generally argued that a
definition of religion from 1792 is unworkable because today many
belief systems some would consider religious would not receive
protection under the Free Exercise Clause because the Framers'
definition would assumedly be theistic and too narrow. In the stead
of the original meaning these commentators offer different
definitions of the meaning of religion varying in scope, but
consistent in their indeterminacy and their subjective basis in the
views of the commentator.
IV.

THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF RELIGION IN THE FIRST AMENDMENT

There are three plausible interpretations of what the word
religion meant when ratified in 1792.' 4 Religion could plausibly
have meant: (1) a system of beliefs based on Christianity; (2) a
monotheistic system of belief;16 or (3) some expanding definition
that included ever-greater types of beliefs from philosophic to
moral to any system of beliefs. This Article will take the Ratifiers
as the relevant group in relation to which this Article will judge the
163. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47
IND. L. 1 (1971) (arguing that to be legitimate (i.e. to comport with democratic theory) a
theory of constitutional interpretation must employ neutral principles and not be based on
the personal predilections of the interpreter).
164. This sentence refers to the results obtained by looking at the original meaning,
and then other interpretative methodologies that take the original meaning into account but
then offer other normative factors to move away from the original meaning. Thus, the first
interpretation is the narrowest possible reading of the text based on the original meaning.
The second interpretation, that religion means a monotheistic belief system, is the definition
this Article finds to be the original meaning of the First Amendment. This second
interpretation may, but is not likely to include, all theistic beliefs. Finally, the third
interpretation is that of the nonoriginalist who disregards the original meaning for some
definition of religion based on normative criteria wholly divorced from the text and history
of the religion clauses.
165. This may include, if the original meaning is stretched, simply, theistic beliefs.
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meaning of religion in the First Amendment. It is the contention of
this Article that religion meant at least a system of beliefs based on
a theistic view of the supernatural and likely encompassed only
monotheistic belief systems including Christianity, Judaism and
Islam (often referred to at the time as Mahometanism). To
ascertain the meaning of the word religion in the Constitution this
Article will look to the "objectified meaning" 1' of the word in an
attempt to arrive at the authoritative meaning used when the First
Amendment (and its text) was given authority by the Ratifiers, i.e.,
when it was ratified.
A.

Background and Colonial Practice

The story is very familiar of how many of the first colonists who
settled in what was to become the United States were devout
Christians seeking refuge from persecution. 167 The New England
colonies were founded, generally, by protestant dissenters from the
Church of England and deigned to create for themselves a society
based and regimented by their understanding of the Bible and its
precepts. 16 The New England colonies were Congregationalist in
character and established congregationalism as the colonial
churches.1w The Middle Atlantic states, including Virginia,
Maryland, 170 and the Southern states of the Carolinas and Georgia,
all, to a greater or lesser degree, had established the Anglican
Church before the Revolution as the state supported and official
church of the colonies.' 7' The remaining states, New York and
166. See SCAUA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 3741 (identifying Justice Scalia's mode
of interpretation which seeks to find, not the subjective intent of the Framers or Ratifiers,
but the objective meaning of the authoritative text as was used by society when the text
received its authority).
167. See e.g., J. HECTOR ST. JOHN DE CREVECOUEUR LETTERS FROM AN AMERIcAN FARMER,
70-77 (Penguin Classics Ed. 1986) (describing the religious nature of Americans in the late
18th Century); PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, 1-109 (1997) (surveying the

founding of the American nation and the religious nature of its people); MCDoNAD, supra
note 76, at 1-57 (discussing the intellectual origins of the Constitution including the religious
background of the American people); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understandingof Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L Rev. 1409 (1990) (giving a detailed
background of the history of the Free Exercise Clause including a description of religious
life in pre-Revolutionary America).
168. See JOHNSON, supra note 167, at 28-117 (discussing the Puritan experiment).
169. McConnell, supra note 167, at 1421-23.
170. Lord Baltimore had originally established Maryland as a haven for prosecuted
Catholics but after the Protestants took control of the colony Maryland became one of the
harsher oppressors of Catholics and established the Church of England. See JOHNSON, supra
note 167, at 55-61; McConneU, supra note 167, at 1424-25.
171. McConnell, supra note 167, at 1423-24.
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Pennsylvania, while generally tolerant of all persons, declared their
belief in God. 172 In all, nine colonies had religious establishments of
one church or sect, 73 while all colonies, except Rhode Island,
expressed a belief in God.174
The colonists were intimately familiar with the establishment and
extent of religious freedom in the mother country, 75 which was the
basic reason for much of the emigration to the New World. 176 In
England, of course, the Crown was also the head of the national
church.'7 The establishment entailed the Test Act of 1672, which
permitted only Anglicans to hold public office.' 78 In addition, all
who held public office were required to deny the doctrine of
transubstantiation, affirm the supremacy of the king over the
Church of England, and show that they had taken communion
according to the rights of the Anglican Church within the previous
year.'7 9 Protestant dissenters were accorded less harsh treatment
than Catholics based on the belief that Catholics had mixed
allegiances, with at least some fealty directed towards the Pope as
a foreign potentate.' s° The most stringent treatment was meted out
to apostates and heretics, those who renounced Christianity by
becoming atheists or the adherent of a "false" religion, and those
who "publicly and obstinately" denied the essential tenets of
Christianity.'8'
Thus, the English background from which the majority of the
colonists originated was one firmly Christian and mainly Anglican.
172. Id. at 1424-25. New York was somewhat odd, with four of its more populous
counties having established the Anglican Church. Id. Indeed, not infrequent disputes arose
when the royal governor would try to extend the establishment to other counties. Id.
173. See ROBERT CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 4 (1982).
174. See 2 STORY, supra note 4, at 592. For example, Penn's charter for Pennsylvania
protected all religious belief that was theistic but restricted office to those who expressed
assent to a minimal Christianity. See McConneU, supra note 167, at 1430.
175. See MCDONALD, supra note 76, at 42-47 (discussing the changes made by the
colonies generally towards more tolerance than was shown of dissenting religions in
England).
176. McConnell, supra note 167, at 1421-23.
177. See 1 WnAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *235-36, *279-80
(John F. Hargrave ed., 21st ed. 1844).
178. Id. at *58-59; McConneU, supra note 167, at 1421.
179. McConneU, supra note 167, at 1422.
180. See 2 WiuiAm BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *53-58 (John F
Hargrave ed., 21st ed. 1844) (setting forth the different restriction on protestant dissenters
and Papists).
181. Id. at *43-50. The penalty for apostasy was lessened from being burnt alive to
other lesser civil penalties, and heretics, if they publicly proclaimed their heresy, would
receive the same fate. Id.
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In addition to proscriptions on belief and worship of non-Anglicans,
there were also restrictions on blasphemy, swearing and cursing,
witchcraft, breaking the Sabbath prohibition on work, and assorted
other offenses of immorality.18s In sum, a specific sect of
Christianity was protected. Although the laws of England were
cognizant of other Christian sects, Judaism, and Islam, which were
relatively tolerated, little is said of polytheism (only perhaps in
reference to "heathens") or of nonbelievers (except in reference to
apostates and atheists who deny all religion). In fact, the listing of
crimes by Blackstone began with those offenses against "Almighty
God" and the "true religion." 1' 3 The discussion of apostasy
describes those who do not believe in a "Supreme Being as not
having the virtue of belief in a future state, in the duties towards
God and fellow man, and the virtue inculcated by Christianity,
which leads one to the conclusion that a religion includes all that
apostates deny."1s4
The colonists, through their charters, selective grants and
restrictions on religious freedom, and their establishments favored
theism, often explicitly favored belief in a Christian God, and in
many cases explicitly granted privileges or withheld restraints to
those who believed in Jesus. In addition, in some colonies, the
belief in Jesus had to be of the sort established by the colonial
religion. Through their selective use of language in describing the
extent of religious freedom and establishment, it appears that the
colonists often equated religion with a theistic belief in a Christian
God, and at least with a monotheistic belief.
The story of the Pilgrims, virtually known to all, is that after two
months out to sea they formed the Mayflower Compact, the
document that was to govern their new society. 185 The Compact
offered the colonists "just and equal laws" based on their religious
beliefs to form a society based on Biblical precepts.'8 6 These
Puritans were "spiritual pilgrims" intent on leaving the corruption
of the Old World behind and beginning a new society.187
Symbolically, God was a co-signatory of the Compact, emphasizing
182. Id. at *59-86.
183. Id. at *43.
184. Id.
185. See JOHNSON, supra note 167, at 25-30 (describing the Pilgrims' purpose, their
voyage, the forming of the Compact and their settlement).
186. Id. at 25.
187. Id. at 25-30.
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His place as part of the overall plan.188 The Compact stated the
purpose of the Pilgrims more succinctly: "having undertaken for the
glory of God, and advancement of the christian faith,... a voyage
to plant the first colony in . . . Virginia. "189 The Pilgrims and the
Mayflower Compact are a clear example of this early,
all-encompassing Christianity.
The earliest colonial foundations were often specifically
attributed to God - a Christian God - and His divine Providence.
The 1662 Charter of Connecticut granted by Charles II finished its
proclamation by stating the numerous purposes for which the
colony was created including bringing to the Indians "the
Knowledge and Obediance of the Only True God, and the Saviour
of Mankind and the Christian Faith."19° Of course, Massachusetts
with its firm grounding in Puritan theology ascribed its purpose to
God. The Crown stated that the purpose of the colony was to
"advance the in Largment of Christian Religion, to the Glory of God
Almighty," and to convert "the People in those Parts unto the true
Worship of God and Christian Religion." 19'
The religious fervor for Christianity was not limited to New
England's faithful. Virginia's First Charter, from 1606, also listed the
spread of Christianity as a purpose of the colony and gave thanks
to God for his providential guidance. 192 The First Charter of North
Carolina of 1663 repeatedly urged as the purpose for the colony the
"Propogation of the Christian Faith," and support of the "Christian
Religion." 9 3
Even the reportedly tolerant Pennsylvania required that on the
"Lord's Day" all persons should refrain from work in proper
emulation of the "Primitive Christians." 19 4 This would, according to
Pennsylvania's Laws Agreed Upon in England, help everyone better
worship and understand God. 9 5 As we can see, the colonies were
settled for religious purposes where religion was narrowly drawn in
Protestant, Christian terms.
Many of the colonial charters and founding documents, while
188. Id. at 25.
189. THE Com~m BiL. OF RIGHTs 52 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).
190. Id. at 14.
191. Id. at 18-19. The Charter of Massachusetts Bay Colony of 1628 ordained that the
"principle end ofr the colony was "obediance of the onely true God and saviour of Mankind,
and the christian faith ...."Id. at 20.
192. Id. at 43.
193. Id. at 26.
194.

THE COMPLETE BiLL OF RIGHTS 31.

195.

Id.
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providing for freedom of religion, restricted that freedom to certain
Christian sects, or to theists, or, as in the case of Massachusetts,
specifically excluded certain groups such as Catholics. The
Massachusetts colonial charter forbid any person entry "suspected
to affect the Superstition of the Chh of Rome . . ."'96 The 1692
Charter of Massachusetts Bay promised protection for liberty of
conscience to all Christians "except Papists."197 Even more tolerant
New York joined in opposition to "popery," declaring that no rights
to freedom of worship shall extend to "Persons of the Romish
Religion," while giving all others who believed in Jesus Christ, as
198
God's only son, freedom in matters of "Religious Concernment."
Vermont limited protection of religious freedom to Protestants and
required everyone observe Sunday and pay tithes to the church of
his choice. 199 New Jersey refused to extend protection to atheists or
2
the "Irreligious." 00
Otherwise, the level of protection for religious conscience or
exercise varied by time and geography.201 William Penn's Delaware
tolerated free practice and individual conscience so long as the
person acknowledged "One Almighty god, the Creator, Upholder
and Ruler of the world."202 In Maryland, originally founded as a
refuge to persecuted Catholics, the 1649 Act Concerning Religion
guaranteed to all those who believed in Jesus Christ "free exercise"
of religion. 203 New Jersey originally gave unqualified protection in
matters of religious practice. 204 Later, however, in the 1683
Fundamental Constitutions for East New-Jersey, the scope of
2°5
protection was limited to those who believed in one God.
The extent of religious liberty in the Carolinas was interesting
26
because of its expansive exemptions provided to non-Anglicans. 0
The original charter of the colony, in 1663, established the Church
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 19.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 25.

199.

THE Comm=irE BinL OF RIGHTS 41-42.

200. Id. at 24.
201. See McConneU, supra note 167, at 1421-30 (offering four different modes of
church-state relationship from a mode of one exclusive established church early in Virginia,
to one with no explicitly established church in Pennsylvania).
202. THE COMPLiE BILL OF RIGHTS 15. In Pennsylvania, religious liberty was granted on
the same grounds as in Delaware. Id. at 31.
203. Id. at 17. This was the first instance of the term "free exercise" being used in an
American document. See McConneU, supra note 167, at 1425.
204. THE CoMPLETE BuL OF RIGHs 23-24.
205. Id. at 24.
206. See id. at 26-30, 35-39.
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of England but allowed for "Indulgencies and Dispensations" in the
case of those who, because of their conscience, could not conform
to the liturgy of the Anglican Church.2 0 Later, in the 1669
Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, the colony required that
any freeman who wished to reside in the colony had to declare his
belief in God and in the public worship of God.2 0 The exemption
for dissenters was also made more explicit both in extent and
reasoning. The 97th Constitution (what today would be called the
97th article) allowed that when any seven "Jews, Heathens, and
other dissenters from the purity of the Christian religion" applied,
they would be granted their own church to which they would pay
tithes and publicly worship God.209 The colonists professed that
they did not want to exclude non-believers, but to make them
intimately familiar with the colonial brand of "pur[e]" Christianity
so they would be enticed to convert.2 10 However, there were three
beliefs to which all dissenters must agree: "That there is a God...
That God is publicly to be worshipped... That it is lawful and the
duty of every man . . . to bear witness to the truth . . . in the
presence of God [such as by] kissing the Bible." 211 The extent of
religious freedom varied in the colonies, but the common core was
theistic and usually in a monotheistic Christian sense.
Restriction on public office was commonplace and often more
rigorous than the requirements for protection of one's religious
beliefs and actions. In Pennsylvania, for example, while one had
only to believe in one God to obtain protection for religious
exercise, to enter into public office one was required to believe in
Jesus Christ as Savior of the World.2 12 New Jersey also gave
religious freedom to all who believed in one God, but required men
in office to believe in Jesus Christ.2 1 3 Connecticut was even stricter,
requiring all public servants be members of the established
church.2 1 4 Thus, in places of authority, even the most tolerant of
the colonies, those who granted religious freedom to theists,
limited office to Christians.
As briefly discussed above, establishments were numerous in the
207.
208.

Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 29.

209.

THE COMPIErE BILL OF RIGHTS 29.

210. Id.
211. Id. at 29-30.
212. Id. at 31-32. Delaware had a similar dichotomy because of Penn's proprietorship of
both colonies. Id. at 15.
213. Id. at 24.
214.

THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGH-TS 13.
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colonies. Massachusetts, as did Connecticut, New Hampshire, and
Vermont, established the Calvinistic Congregational church.2 1 5 The
establishments varied in intensity from that in Massachusetts where
dissenters were actively prosecuted, 2 16 to the multi-establishment in
New Hampshire where each town was required to have an
established church, but the majority of the town chose the specific
denomination. 217 The familiar Church of England was established in
Virginia, Maryland (after the initial religious tolerance), the
Carolinas and Georgia. 21 8 In New York (except where the Anglican
Church was established in four counties), New Jersey, Rhode
Island, Pennsylvania and Delaware, de facto tolerance of Christian
sects reigned. 2 9 The number and level of establishments give an
insight into the view of the colonists' as to the importance of
religion and what they viewed as a religion, with all established
sects being Christian.
The discussion above details the extent of religious feeling in the
colonies, their practices, and official judgements on religion.
Religious toleration was generally expanding, but at base only
theism, and generally Christian theism, was protected. In areas of
special concern, the colonies restricted even further the reach of
what was an acceptable religion. Finally, most colonies still
established specific Christian sects.
The intellectual background with which the Founders and
Ratifiers were familiar was as deep as it was varied. The Founders
knew the writings of the ancients, as well as the works of more
recent political theorists such as Locke,?2° Montisque, Burke,221 and
215.
216.

McConneU, supra note 167, at 1436.
Id. at 1422-23.

217.

See

LEONARD

W. LmY,

TH

ESTABLISHMENT

CLAUs&

RELIGION

AND

THE

FIRST

AMENDMENT 42-43 (2d ed. 1986).
218. McConneU, supra note 167, at 1423.
219. Id. at 1424-25.
220. Id. at 1430. Locke's influence on the Founders and Ratifiers in the subject of
religion was marked by belief in a social contract and natural rights, but little understanding
of what Lockean theory entailed in the particulars. Richard Henry Lee, when discussing the
proposed Constitution, referred to it as a "Social Compact." Richard Henry Lee, in 1 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 337 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976).
John Leland's objections (Leland being a prominent Baptist minister) to the Constitution
were enclosed in a letter to James Madison from Joseph Spencer. Letter of Joseph Spencer
to James Madison, in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

424-25 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds., 1988) (Feb. 28, 1787). Leland's first objection was to
a lack of a Bill of Rights, which, he claimed, "whenever Number of men enter into a State of
Society, . . . there should always be a memorial of those not surrendered otherwise every
natural & domestic Right becomes alienable . . . ." Id. at 425. While not totally accurate
Lockean theory, the language and concepts used are unmistakably Locke.
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others. The influence of the writings of John Locke upon the
Founders is well noted.2 2 Locke posited that in the world of
actions, the world governed by the civil government, the
government and its determinations were supreme. 22 As a result, the
government that was instituted to protect and prevent infringement
of rights could do so at the expense of a person's religious beliefs,
but since another's beliefs cannot, in a Lockean sense, harm
24
another, the government has no right to interfere with beliefs. If
an individual's beliefs urged him to disobey a law, Locke argued
that since the sphere of religion is not that of the world of actions,
and since there is no higher power on Earth to whom the objector
can appeal to, the dissenter must obey his conscience and suffer
2
the penalties inflicted by the magistrate. 2
It is interesting, however, to find that Locke also advocated a
mild religious establishment where the government could use
When urging a bill of rights be amended to the Constitution, An Old Whig V proposed a
clause affirming that those rights not delegated remain in the people and, as an example,
stated that liberty of conscience was one of those inherent, natural rights that "indeed [the
people] have not even the right to surrender." See An Old Whig V, in 13 THE DocuMErrnAY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 538-39 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds.,
1983) (originally published in the Pennsylvania Independent Gazetteer on Nov. 1, 1788). The
argument was obviously based on Locke's consent theory in that only those rights that the
people consent to surrender are relinquished. One has to question, however, whether the
right to religious liberty was a right that was unalienable with one's consent. See, however,
LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 65, § 131 (stating "the power of the Society... can never be
suppos'd to extend farther than the common good .... ").
Brutus, on January 17, 1788, asserted, as did Locke, that the "design of civil government is
to protect the rights and promote the happiness of the people." See Brutus IX, in 15 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONsTrrunON 393 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino
eds., 1984) (Originally printed in the New York Journal on Jan. 17, 1788). The quoted phrase
is like Locke's reasoning in why men enter society: "The great end of Mens entering into
Society, being the enjoyment of their Properties in Peace and Safety ....
" See LocKE,
GOVERNMENT, supra note 65, § 134.
221. See RusSELL Kimu THE CONSERVATIVE CONSTTUnON (1990) (emphasizing the fact that
the Founders were familiar with and inclined towards Burke's political views).
222. See e.g., MCDONALD, surpa note 76, 7 (referring to, as an example of Locke's
influence, the numerous references to his theories in the Federal Convention); GARY ROSEN,
AMERIcAN COMPACT JAMES MADISON AND THE PROBLEM OF THE FOUNDING 5 (1999) (noting that

scholars have found Locke's influence on Madison's thinking "determinative"); McConneU,
supra note 167, at 1430 (stating "[Locke's influence on the Founders] was most extensive
and.., his influence on the Americans and the first amendment was most direct"). See also
McConnell, supra note 167, at 1430-32 (discussing different examples of Locke's influence on
the different Founders, including references found in Jefferson's, Madison's, and Isaac
Backus's (an influential Baptist preacher) writings).
223. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration 9-19, in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN LocKE
(London 1823).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 43.
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religion and religious arguments to improve the citizens of the
commonwealth and "thereby draw the heterodox into the way of
the truth, and procure their salvation .
"216 In addition, while
Locke advocated tolerance of different religious views (because
Locke's theories limited the sphere to which religious views were
applicable, namely one's own conscience), the same tolerance was
not extended to Catholics and atheists. 227 Like Blackstone (or
rather, Blackstone like Locke), Locke justified placing restrictions
on Catholics because of their mixed allegiance, and justified not
extending tolerance to atheists because atheists do not have the
moral scruples to be trusted in a civil society where rights are
viewed as having derived from God, and because the atheist has no
fear of a future state of punishment. 2
Locke also forbade interference by the state in matters of
religion because, "obedience is due in the first place to God, and
afterwards to the laws" of man. 229 Also, since each person,
according to Locke, who believed in God was unable to
demonstrate the veracity of those beliefs, there was no basis upon
which the civil government could force the believer to change his
beliefs. 2 Thus, government could not interfere in the sphere of
faith and religion because the authority for the beliefs was of a
higher authority than the civil government, not a product of
individual will, and because the civil government could not prove
that the beliefs were necessarily wrong.
The intellectual foundation provided by Locke to the Founders
and Ratifiers carried with it a view of religion based on belief in a
God, a Christian God, belief in whom carried with it duties and the
threat of punishment for transgression of those duties. So while
Locke scaled back the purported sphere of influence of religion in
society to the individual, and increased the sphere of authority for
the civil government, Locke also retained a thoroughly
monotheistic, and in some sense a Christian, view of religion.
In summary, the experiences of the colonies in relation to
religion was one of a more expansive view over time, but on the
eve of the revolution, the legal, social and theoretical climate was
still thoroughly Christian and theist.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 46-47.
John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration 46-47, in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE.
Id. 43.
Id. at 139-43.
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B. Post Revolutionary Experience
The people of the new nation remained religious with new
vibrant evangelical sects cropping-up throughout the new states.
The Great Awakening was the response of these evangelical sects,
especially the Baptists, to what was viewed as a general decline in
231
the moral standard of Americans.
During and after the Revolution the newly independent states
experimented with broader provisions in their new constitutions
pertaining to religious freedom and narrowed establishments by
allowing multiple establishments, by completely exempting some
from the requirements of the establishment, or by eliminating their
establishments all together. The states of Georgia,2
South
2
Carolina, 3 North Carolina, and New York all disestablished the
Anglican Church within two years after the Revolution.
Virginia
followed in 1785 while Maryland's legislature retained formal
control over the established church but offered no support.2m The
New England Congregational establishments fared better because
of their initial and continued opposition to the Crown and because,
unlike where the Church of England was established, the churches
of the New England states were creatures of popular support.2
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Rhode Island and Delaware maintained
237
their no establishment policy.
The dismemberment, or reduction in the severity, of many
established churches reflected the growing variety of religious
opinion in the states.m But while nearly all establishments were
either broadened or done away with, the states protected in their
religious freedom clauses only theistic beliefs. One consistent
theme among all the states and their provisions for religious
231.

See J.C. FURNAS, THE AMERICANS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNrrED STATES 323-31

(1969) (describing the religious fervor of America).
232. While Georgia disestablished the Anglican Church it did allow the legislature to
tax each person to support the religion of his choice. McConnell, supra note 167, at 1436.
233. South Carolina did establish the "Protestant religion" in its constitution but offered
no support - the establishment was merely hortatory. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. The Maryland Declaration of Rights from 1776 permits the legislature to "lay a
general and equal tax for the support of the christian religion .... " that allowed each person
to appoint the church of his choosing as the beneficiary of his taxes. THE Commuwm Bi OF
RIGHTS 17.
236. McConnell, supra note 167, at 1437.
237. Id. at 1436.
238.

See LEONARD

W.

LEVY,

THE

EsTABLisHMENT

CiAus&- RELIGION

AND

THE FRST

AMENDMENT ch. 2 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing the movement towards disestablishment and
multi-establishments).
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freedom was the emphasis on the understanding that freedom was
granted only as to a belief in "Almighty God." Some states, like
South Carolina, went further and protected only those who
worshipped a Christian God. In either scenario, the protection fits
well with a Lockean view of the role of government vis a vis
religion.m Namely, that government had no business in the affairs
of religion but could support a mild establishment and exclude
from religious protection atheists and Catholics.
The different states often adopted provisions for religious
freedom. The Delaware Declaration of Rights, enacted in 1776,
stated in section two that "all men have a natural and unalienable
right to worship Almighty God . . . and that no man . . . can be
compelled to attend any religious worship . . ."24o In section three
the Declaration provides that "all persons professing the Christian
religion . . . unless, under colour of religion, any man disturb the
peace" shall be treated equally.241 Section two was the state's free
exercise clause while section three was a sort of equal protection
clause for religious faiths. Section two equates religion with
worshipping one "Almighty" God, and section three restricts equal
protection explicitly to Christians. 242 Pennsylvania likewise
protected those who acknowledged "the being of a God."243
The Maryland Declaration of Rights, also from 1776, like the
Delaware Declaration parallels the worship of one "God" to
"religious liberty," but also again restricts equal protection of
religions to Christians. 2 " Massachusetts was more explicit in its
making a belief in one "SUPREME BEING, the Great Creator and
Preserver of the Universe" synonymous with religion.245
Consequently, the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution provided for
religious freedom to those "worshipping GOD" who did not disrupt
239. See supra notes 220-30, and accompanying text (discussing the impact of Locke
on the Founding generation). In the provisions in the state constitutions guaranteeing
religious freedom, the clauses inevitably speak in Lockean terms of inherent, natural and
unalienable rights. See generally the state provisions of Delaware, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Virginia in THE COMPLmE Biu. OF RIGHTS 15-46.
240. THE COMPLETE BuL OF RIGMHS 15. It appears that "worship" was a subset and an
integral part of a religion. See e.g., id. at 26 (N.Y CONST. art. 38 (1777)) (protecting religious
"Profession and Worship").
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 32. The 1790 Constitution of Pennsylvania protected the "right to worship
Almighty God," and went on to discuss that which no such believer could be forced to do
including be compelled to attend worship, support a ministry, or any other "religious"
establishment. Id. at 33.
244. Id. at 17.
245.

ThE COMPLETE BIL OF RIGHTS 20-21.
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the public peace. 246 New Hampshire, in its 1783 constitution,
protected the "worship of GOD" and of the "DEITY."24 7 New Jersey
restricted religious freedom to Protestants in Article XIX, but in
Article XVIII protected those who desired to worship "Almighty
God."24 8 In either case, a belief in one God was protected and
equated with a religion. Virginia, with its well-entrenched
established church granted the "free exercise of religion" so that
"religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator," would not be
infringed. 249
While the Carolinas had originally provided for an elaborate
system of multi-establishments by allowing dissenters to pay their
duties to their own church if their belief system met three
requirements, 26° North and South Carolina took separate paths after
the Revolution. North Carolina protected the right to worship of
those who believed in "Almighty God"2' and disestablished the
Anglican Church, while South Carolina protected only those who
professed a belief in "one God, and a future state of Rewards and
Punishments, and that God is to be publicly worshipped." 252 In
addition, South Carolina declared the "Christian Protestant
Religion" to be the established religion, thus creating a
multi-establishment so long as the different Protestant sects
adhered to five articles of faith. 25 In both cases, though, religion at
least meant a belief in one God.
In sum, following the Revolution and the gaining of
246. Id. Vermont protected the right to "worship Almighty God" so that no such person
could be forced to "attend any religious Worship . . . or support any Place of Worship." Id.
at 41. In other words, religious worship was equivalent to the worship of God. Vermont still
required, in its 1777 Constitution, that all observe the Sabbath and support the church of his
choosing "most agreeable to the revealed Will of God." Id. at 41-42.
247. Id. at 22-23.
248. Id. at 25.
249. Id. at 44.
250. See .supranotes 201-06, and accompanying text (discussing the original scheme of
the Carolina religious establishment).
251. THE CoMPL'rE Bi". OF RIGHTS 29.
252. Id. at 39.
253. Id. at 40. The five articles were:
That there is one eternal God, and a future State of Rewards and Punishments....
That God is publickly to be worshipped.... That the Christian Religion is the true
Religion .... That the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are of Divine
Inspiration, and are of the Rule of Faith and Practice.... That it is lawful, and the
Duty of every Man, being thereunto called by those that govern, to bear witness to the
Truth.
Id. The five articles are similar to the three original articles of faith dissenters were obliged
to believe with the addition of professing that the Christian religion is the one true religion,
and that the Scriptures are of Divine inspiration. Id. at 38, 40.
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independence, the states reacted with varying degrees of
willingness towards religious freedom. All states, however, only
protected belief in a God, almost always a belief in one God, and
often only a belief in a Christian God. The extent of protection
varied per state, with most extending the bulwark of religious
freedom only to religious worship2 while others also protected
religious exercise. It seems, however, that religion was generally
seen as entailing worship, thus the exemption.
The new states often maintained religious tests (some well after
the First Amendment was ratified) that were more specific and
narrow than were their free exercise clauses. Tolerant Pennsylvania
in its 1776 Constitution restricted legislators to those who could
maintain a belief in God, a God who rewards and punishes, and
believed that both the Old and New Testaments are of Divine
inspiration. 25 Likewise, the state of New Jersey, otherwise
moderate in its treatment of dissenters, required office holders to
state their adherence to a Protestant sect.25 Maryland required no
other test for public office than that the person swear that he has a
belief in the "christian religion."2 5 Massachusetts required an oath
to the effect that the person believed in "the christian religion" for
2
all offices in the executive and legislative branches. 5
After the Revolution, while many states were, to a greater or
259
lesser extent, expanding the scope of religious freedom, many of
the most "tolerant" states continued to restrict office to those who
254. McConnell, supra note 167, at 1460 (listing eight states as confining their
protection to worship).
255. THE COMPLmE BiLL OF RImTS 33. The 1790 state constitution still required office
holders to state a belief in a God who rewards and punishes, but no longer required a
profession in the Divine inspiration of the Bible. Id.
256. Id. at 25.
257. Id. at 18.
258. Id. at 22. Vermont required members of the legislature to proclaim their conviction
that God was the creator of the universe, that He rewards good and punishes evil, that the
Bible is Divinely inspired, and that he is an adherent to the "Protestant Religion." Id. at 42.
259. There was a general trend among Americans to be more accommodating of other
sects and even other religions. Benjamin Rush, for example, noted with satisfaction the
Fourth of July Parade in 1788 in Philadelphia, and the arrangement of the different ministers
and religious leaders. See Benjamin Rush: Observations on the Fourth of July Processionin
Philadelphia,in

18 THE DOcuaENT

Y HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTYnTON 265

(J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds., 1995) (Originally printed in the Pennsylvania Mercury on
July 15, 1788). The clergy marched arm-in-arm, with those ministers the most dissimilar in
beliefs paired together. Id. Rush referred to the "Rabbi of the Jews, locked in the arms of
two ministers of the gospel," as a "most delightful sight." Id. Rush then added, that the ban
on religious tests would further this toleration of religions because offices would be open
"not only to every sect of Christians, but to worthy men of every religion." Id. Clearly,
Judaism was recognized by Rush to be a religion.
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would swear to a belief in a Biblical God who punished and
rewarded, and sometimes more narrowly to those who were
Christians, and sometimes even more narrowly to Protestants. The
emphasis on a monotheistic belief in a God, belief in Whom
required performance of duties and entailed a belief in an afterlife,
was a consistent refrain. In addition, it is clear that the God in
question was a Biblical God.
The states, before, during and after the Revolution, maintained
prohibitions on blasphemy and other offenses against God and
Christianity. Virginia, for example, proscribed swearing and cursing
stating that "if any person or persons shall profanely swear or
curse, or shall be drunk ... [they] shall forfeit [money]." 26° In the
famous 1811 case by Chancellor Kent, the English common law
that had clearly proscribed blasphemy was held applicable to New
York, even though there was no established church, because
26 1
blasphemy tends "to the dissolution of civil government."
Blasphemy was defined as "maliciously reviling God, or religion,"
but in the context of the United States, the religion in question was
Christianity.262 Since the defendant's actions caused Christianity to
fall into disrepute, they threatened society and could be
prohibited. 26 The enforcement of sanctions against defiling
Christianity brings to light the thorough strength of sentiment in
the nation around the time of the Constitution and the First
Amendment in reference to the high repute with which religion and
particularly Christianity was held. These prohibitions also give
insight into the Christian background surrounding the Ratifiers and
Framers.
James Madison's famous and oft-quoted Memorial and
Remonstrance was given in opposition to a bill "establishing a
provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion." 264 Madison used
numerous arguments, some drawn directly from Locke. He claimed
that since religious doctrines were unprovable, the civil government
had no basis upon which it could intermeddle in religious affairs,
and that each individual had an inherent right to religious
260. Virginia Revised Laws, c. 142 (Statute of 1792), in JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE
BELIEVER AND THE POWERs THAT ARE 133 (1987).
261. The People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 225 (N.Y 1811), in JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE
BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE 134-35.
262. Id. at 134.
263. Id. at 134-35.
264.

8 THE ARTICLES OF JAMES MADISON 298-301 (Robert A. Rutland et al eds. 1996).
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freedom. 2 5 Madison also claimed that since religion "is a duty
towards God," the civil government could not interfere with
religious beliefs: "[t]his duty is precedent, both in order of time and
degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society."26 Madison,
therefore, viewed religion as entailing a belief in God and the
believer's duty to the "Universal Sovereign" took precedence over
267
the claims of government.
The Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia adopted, with little
discussion, a ban on religious tests for office in the new national
government. 268 Thus, while all would be required to swear or affirm
their intent to support the Constitution, 269 no one would be
excluded because of their religious beliefs. Those who did not like
the proposed Constitution derided the exclusion as allowing
non-Protestants or non-Christians or even non-theists to gain office
in the new national government, while the defenders argued that
religious test clauses were ineffectual and an engine for tyranny. In
making their arguments, both sides give insight to what
characteristics they believed a religion to posses.
Generally, the argument for religious tests was the necessity of
keeping out of office those who were not Christians, or at least
those who did not believe in an afterlife and thus ensure
principled, like-minded officers. One proposed religious test offered
in the New Haven Gazette would have required the oath-taker
swear in the name "of the all-seeing DEITY" that he would, among
other things, consider himself subject to the "Almighty Lawgiver
265. Id. at 299-300.
266. Id. at 299.
267. Id. at 299-300.
268. See e.g., 1 ELiaOr's DEBATFS 271 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1891) (noting that "[i]t was
moved and seconded to add the following clause to the 20th article: 'but no religious test
shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the authority of
the United States;' which passed unanimously in the affirmative"); McConnell, supra note
167, at 1473-76 (discussing the radical departure that the religious test ban created from past
practice). See also Luther Martin: Genuine Information XII, in 16 THE DocuumErARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 89 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds., 1986)

(Originally printed in the Baltimore Maryland Gazette on Feb. 8, 1789) (stating that although
the ban on religious tests passed by "a very great majority" in the Federal Convention, "there
were some members so unfashionable as to think that a belief in the existence of a Deity,
and of a state of future rewards and punishments would be some security for the good
conduct of our rulers, and that in a Christian country it would be at least decent to hold out
some distinction between the professors of Christianity and downright infidelity or
paganism"). Martin did not agree with the sentiments of those he deemed unfashionable, but
he did recognize (as presumably did those criticized by Martin) that a religion was a belief in
a God who commanded obedience to His laws.
269. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl 3.
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and Judge," and devote himself to the service of "GOD."270 Many
contemporaries wished to see at least some mention of religion "of a God, His perfections, and His providence"- so William
Williams proposed a test that required a belief in "one living and
true God, the creator and supreme Governor of the world," the
worldly authority of God's laws, and that all rightful authority is
derived from God. 271 Both proposed tests offer a view of religion in
which there is one God who requires believers to act in accord
with His law on threat of penalty or promises of reward. A revised
Constitution offered by the antifederalist Society of Western
Gentlemen included a religious test that required office holders to
affirm "a belief in the one only true God, who is the rewarder of
the good, and the punishment of the evil." 272 Again, this test
equated a belief in one God who imposed duties on His believers
with religion.
Many who desired a religious oath were emphatic in their belief
that God would forsake the new nation because of the refusal to
require a belief in Him for office. 273 Thomas Wilson feared that the
nation would have "infidels" in office because of the Constitution's
274
failure to mention God's name in a religious requirement.
Cincinnatus III invoked God's blessing on the new enterprise
275
because of the Constitution's failure to protect religious liberty.
Cincinnatus feared that the ban on religious tests implied that the
federal government otherwise had the power to regulate religion,
270. 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 588 (Merrill
Jensen ed., 1978) (originally published in the New Haven Gazette, Jan. 31, 1788).
271. William Williams to the Printer, in 3 THE DoCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION
OF THE CONsTITUTION 589 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978) (originally published in the American

Mercury, Feb. 11, 1788). Williams went on to disavow any desire to exclude any particular
sect of Christians, implying that he wanted only to exclude only non-Christians from office,
but his proffered oath could easily be taken by a Jew or Muslim. Id.
272. The Society of Western Gentlemen Revise the Constitution, in 8 THE DOcUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 771 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds., 1990)

(originally published in the Virginia Independent Chronicle, April 30, 1787).
273. Letter of Thomas Wilson to Archibald Stuart, in 8 TaE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 145 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds., 1988) (Nov. 4,

1787). Others believed just as strongly that God sanctified the Constitution. Americanus II
stated that the "Foederal Constitution is, in one respect, like the Christian religion, the more
minutely it is discussed, the more perfect it will appear." Id. at 244-47 (originally printed in
the Virginia Independent Chronicle, Dec. 19, 1787). The Constitution "certainly received the
solemn sanction of Heaven .... " Id. at 245. In fact, the "Constitution, like our holy religion,
knows no invidious distinctions." Id. at 247.
274. Id.
275. Cincinnatus III: To James Wilson, Esquire, in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTrruTON 124-25 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds., 1983) (originally

published in the New York Journal on Nov. 15, 1788).
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276
so he implored Heaven to "have mercy on the world and on us."
Edmund Pendleton questioned why the Federal Convention even
included an oath at all if, as was argued by the proponents of the
ban on religious tests, the oath in Article VI was really a religious
test for those who believed in God and a future state. 277 Thus
equating religion with God and a future state, Pendleton asserted
that "since a belief of a Future State of Rewards & Punishments,
can alone give consciensious Obligation to observe an Oath, [i]t
would seem that [a religious] Test should be required or Oaths
278
abolished.
In a letter to President Washington, John Armstrong urged that a
religious test was necessary to preserve Christianity. 279 In the letter
Armstrong argued that the test need not be specific, so as to allow
all Christians entry into office, but a test must declare a belief in
the "One living & true God, [and] who . . . shall judge us
righteously at the end of the world."2 While Washington apparently
disagreed with Armstrong's sentiment concerning a religious test,
belief system with one God
Armstrong did believe religion, and a281
and a future state, to be synonymous.
Madison's defense of the test ban was premised on the reasoning

276. Id. at 125.
277. Letter of Edmund Pendleton to James Madison, in 10 THE DocuMENTARY HISrORY
OF THE RATIFCATION OF THE CONsTrrmrON 1773-75 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds., 1988) (Oct.
8, 1787). In Washington's farewell address, he reminded the American People of the
importance of religion in national and private life. "Where is the security," he asked, "for
property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert the oaths which
are the instruments of investigation in the courts of justice?" George Washington Farewell
Address, in JOHN T. NOONAN, JR, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE 132 (1987)
(September 17, 1796). Washington believed that the future state of rewards and punishment
to which the religious believer ascribed were essential to the virtuous, free society.
278. Letter of Edmund Pendleton to James Madison, in 10 THE DocuamNuARY HISrORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1774 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds., 1988) (Oct. 8,
1787).
279. Letter from John Armstrong to George Washington, in 1 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 253-57 (W.W. Abbot ed., 1987) (January 27, 1789).
280. Id. at 254. See also id. at 255 (defining religion as a belief in one God to whom we
are finally accountable). Armstrong did not think highly of Jefferson who, building on Locke,
did not care if his neighbor believed in "'One God, twenty gods, or no God at all,'" because
belief of another alone would not harm him. Id. at 256. Armstrong was aghast that Jefferson
would so nonchalantly toss aside what had been the bedrock of Christianity - belief in one
true God. Id.
281. A letter from the Presbyterian Ministers of Massachusetts and New Hampshire
showed their desire to restrict to believers in Jesus and God the ability to hold office. See
Letter from the Presbyterian Ministers of Massachusetts and New Hampshire to George
Washington, in 4 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 274-75 (W. W. Abbott & Dorothy Twohig
eds., 1993) (November 2, 1789). The ministers advocated a religious test that would limit
office to the broadest scope of Christianity.
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that any oath requirement was inherently religious because if the
person is religious and fears in the retribution of God, he will abide
by the oath and if not then not.28 2 In addition, Madison proffered
the much-used argument that a nonreligious person would take a
religious oath and lie anyway so religious oaths have no value. 2
Assumed by Madison is the idea that if a person is religious they
believe in a God who rewards and punishes.
The defenders of the ban, while arguing against the efficacy of
religious tests, still adhered to the common understanding of what
a religion was. Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut wrote that the ban
on religious tests prevented persecution based on religious belief
and ensured that "every man has a right to worship God in that
way which is most agreeable to his own conscience." 284 Ellsworth
thus equated religious tests and religion with a belief in and
2
worship of God. ss
Others supported the ban arguing that the secular oath that
remains, while not explicitly religious, is still a religious test to the
effect that those who swear to uphold the Constitution and are
believers in a "God who is the Avenger of Perjury" will take the
oath as a religious oath. 8 6 Oliver Wolcott argued that such an oath
is an appeal to God and acknowledgement of a future state like any
religious test, and had the added benefit of not excluding anyone
because of their religious "sect."2s7 The religion Wolcott referred to
was monotheistic, and required duties of believers in God.
Another argument used to buttress the ban on religious test was
that all "wise and good citizen[s]" would be allowed to hold the
public trust regardless of their affiliation with a particular sect. 288
282. Letter of James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, in 8 TUE DocUMENTARY HISrORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 125-26 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds., 1988) (Oct. 28,
1787).
283. Id. at 126.
284.

Ellsworth, A Landholder VII, in 14 THE DocuMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION

OF THE CONSTTTION 448, 449 (J. Kaminsid & G. Saladino eds. 1983) (originally published in
the Connecticut Courant, Dec. 17, 1787).
285. But see, FederalFarmer An Additional Number of Letters to the Republicans, in
17 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFiCATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 310 (J. Kaminski & G.

Saladino eds., 1986) (May 2, 1789) (including as religions when discussing the benefits of the
religious test ban: Christians, Pagans, Mohametans, and Jews). The inclusion of Paganism as
a religion may possibly include polytheism, but the vast majority of references to religion
found were monotheistic.
286. Oliver Wolcott, in 3 TaE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 558 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978) (originally published in the Connecticut Courant,
Jan. 14, 1787).
287. Id.
288. Tench Cox, An American Citizen IV: On the Federal Government, in 13 THE
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The well-known Federalist, Tench Cox, argued that, unlike in the
Catholic nations of Europe where no Protestant can hold office,
and in England where no Catholic can hold office, under the new
Constitution all men of virtue would be admitted to public trust.289
In making his argument, Cox reaffirmed that any other course of
action (allowing use of religious tests) was a "trespass on the
Majesty of Heaven." 290 Even if Cox did not think religious tests wise
policy, he still acknowledged his belief in God and Heaven.
In response to an objector to the ban who proposed that the
Constitution explicitly refer to and affirm God's Divine providence;
a writer named Elihu did not dispute the religious devotion of
Americans. 291 Instead, he urged that such a declaration was as
unnecessary as it was not useful. 292 Since all believe in God, "it is
calculated to exclude from office fools only, who believe there is
no God."293 Besides, the author contended, the Framers knew and
understood the providential hand of God was involved in the
development of the nation and the Constitution, so no explicit
acknowledgement of God was necessary. 294 However construed,
Elihu's arguments are based on an understanding of religion as
encompassing a belief in God.
Another tactic used to defend the ban on religious tests was the
295
argument from faction, employed by Madison in Federalist Ten,
and others. Edmund Randolph in the Virginia Ratification
Convention expressed the sentiment when he stated that he was "a
friend of a variety of sects, because they keep one another in
order."296 The innumerable number of relatively equally strong sects
432 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino
eds., 1983) (originally published in the Pennsylvania Gazette on Oct 21, 1788).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Elihu stated that "all universally are agreed [that] everybody believes there is a
God; not a man of common sense in the United States denies or disbelieves it." Elihu, in 3
THE DoCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTON 591 (Merrill Jensen ed.,
1988) (originally published in the American Mercury, Feb. 18, 1788).
292. Id. at 591-92.
293. Id. at 592 (emphasis deleted).
294. Id.
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTON

295.

10 THE FEDERALIST ARTICLES (James Madison).

296. Edmund Randolph, in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATICATION OF THE
CONSTMMON 1100-01 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladin eds., 1988) (June 10, 1788). See
also James Madison in the Virginia Convention, in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISrORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTImON 1223-24 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladin eds., 1993)
(June 12, 1788) (reiterating his argument about the benefit of numerous religious factions
found in Federalist Ten: "no one sect will ever be able to out number the rest").
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would prevent any one sect from creating an establishment. 297 In a
letter to Thomas Jefferson, James Madison stated in slightly
different terms his Federalist argument stating that faction may be
based on religious differences, which was good by adding to the
298
variety of factions.
The defenders of the religious test ban saw the ban as allowing
those of all religions access to government office. In his sermon,
preached August 24, 1788, Manasseh Cutler stated that "[n]o one
kind of religion, or sect of religion, is established . . ."m Cutler's
claim is that religion is broader than Christianity alone and
encompasses other belief systems, but Cutler also seemed to
°°
believe that a religion must at least entail a belief in a God.M
Cutler also argued that Christianity did not need the protection of a
30 1
religious test because of its truth.
Our first President, upon his election, was offered
congratulations by numerous religious denominations to which he
often responded in thanksgiving to God and with reassurance that
the national government would not intermeddle with the affairs of
the sect that had addressed him. For instance, in the famous
exchange with the Hebrew Congregations of Philadelphia, New
York, Charleston and Richmond, President Washington reassured
the small Jewish population of the nation that their belief system
was also to be given the protections afforded the Christian
denominations. 302 Washington noted the influence of the "Almighty"
in the Revolution.3 He also assured the Jews of their continuing
security in matters of religion:
297. Randolph, supra note 296, at 1101.
298. James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATCATION OF THE CONsTrrurON 448-49 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds., 1983) (Oct. 24,
1788). In that same letter Madison questioned the efficacy of religious tests referring to the
innumerable acts committed by legislatures that had taken religious oaths and argues that if
asked to do the same act separately, their individual consciences would have prevented the
legislators from doing so. Id.
299. Manasseh Cutler Sermon, in 18 THE DoCuMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTrruTON 341-42 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds., 1995) (Aug. 24, 1788).
300. Id. at 341 (praising the beneficence of God and His grace showered on the United
States).

301. Id.
302. Letter from George Washington to the Hebrew Congregations of Philadelphia, New
York, Charleston, and Richmond, in 7 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 61-63 (Dorothy
Twohig ed. 1998) (December 13, 1790); see also Letter from George Washington to the
Hebrew Congregation in Newport, in 6 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 284-86 (Dorothy
Twohig ed., 1996) (August 18, 1790) (exchange with the Hebrew Congregation of Newport).
303. 7 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 61-63.
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All possess similar liberty of conscience and immunities of
citizenship. It is now no more that toleration is spoken of, as
if it was by the indulgence of one class of people, that another
enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural rights. For
happily, the Government of the United States, . . . gives to
bigotry no sanction.3
In other words, Washington viewed Judaism as a religion like
Christianity. While the personal subjective views of one person on
what a word meant are not determinative to original meaning
interpretation, the usage of a word by a person acquainted with it
is evidence of what the word meant. In this context, where
Washington is expounding upon the "liberality of sentiment" in
relation to every "religious denomination of men in this Country,"
his inclusion of Judaism as one of the religions is demonstrative of
the larger meaning used by society.305
In a letter to the Commissioners to the Southern Indians,
Washington commended missionaries to the tribes. 306 By teaching
the tribes Christianity, Washington believed the Indians would learn
the "great duties of religion." 3 7 In his first Thanksgiving
Proclamation, Washington asked God to "pardon [the] nation['s] . . .
transgressions."318 Washington was asking God to pardon the nation
for failing to live up to the duties God had imposed and for
transgressing God's laws. Like Judaism, which Washington recognized as a religion, Washington viewed religion as encompassing
duties towards God.
The Revolution caused a further expansion of religious freedom
through the enactment of religious freedom guarantees, and caused
the dismemberment of many of the church establishments. In doing
304. 6 THE PAPES OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 284-86 (Dorothy Twohig ed., 1996) (August
17, 1790) (exchange with the Hebrew Congregation of Newport).
305. In a letter to the Quakers, President Washington iterated his theistic view of
religion, charging that the individual is responsible only to his "Maker" for his religion. See
Letter from George Washington to the Society of Quakers, in 4 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 265-67 (W. W. Abbott & Dorothy Twohig eds., 1993) (October, 1789). Thus, all
could "worship Almighty God agreable to their Consciences." Id. at 266. In a later letter to
the Jews of Savannah, Washington repeatedly praised the "Deity" while assuring the Hebrew
Congregation that all who show "reverence to the Deity" will be protected in their religious
exercise. Letter from George Washington to the Savannah Hebrew Congregation, in 5 THE
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 448-49 (Dorothy Twohig ed. 1996) (October, 1789).
306. Letter from George Washington to the Commissioners to the Southern Indians, in
3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 558 (W. W. Abbott ed., 1989) (August 29, 1789).
307. Id.
308.

Thanksgiving Proclamation, in 4 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 131-32 (W. W.

Abbott ed., 1993) (October 3, 1789).
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so, however, the newly independent states restricted religious
protection to theists and often only to Christians, and even where
the official churches were disestablished, Christianity still received
protection and many states continued less exclusive establishments.
C. Enactment of the First Amendment
One of the main arguments used by the Anti-Federalists and
others opposed to the new Constitution was the lack of a Bill of
Rights securing the peoples' inalienable rights to ensure that the
national government would remain a government with a limited
sphere of influence. 309 Philadelphiensis VI, arguing that the
American experiment would fail without protection of the
fundamental rights of Americans, held up the Ottoman Empire as
the end result of no rights protection. 310 Labeled "bigotted infidels,"
it was argued that their religion taught them to "murder without
309. See McDONALD, supra note 76, at 269-70; SAMuEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OxFORD
HISTORY OF THE AmamcAN PEOPLE 319 (1965). Madison resisted the movement for a Bill of
Rights out of fear that any enumeration of rights would imply two ideas: that the federal
government had authority over the area that the enumerated rights exempted even though
Madison believed that the enumeration of the federal government's powers restricted the
scope of federal power so as not to be able to infringe on rights, and that the enumeration
of rights would imply that other rights, not enumerated were not protected and were within
the authority of the national government to infringe. See LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND
THE FRAMERS' CONSTIrTrION 153-59 (1988). During the national debate on whether to ratify the
Constitution and whether a Bill of Rights was necessary Madison wrote a revealing letter to
Jefferson offering Madison's view of what the society at the time understood the term
religion to encompass. Madison wrote:
I am sure that the rights of Conscience in particular, if submitted to public definition
would be narrowed much more than they are likely ever to be by an assumed power.
One of the objections in New England was that the Constitution by prohibiting
religious tests opened a door for Jews, Turks, & infidels.
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 17, 1788, in 11 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 297 (Rutland ed.). Madison, then, understood the popular definition of
religion, here used synonymously with "Conscience," to exclude religions other than
Christianity. Interestingly, the New Englanders Madison refers to did not believe that only
one denomination of protestant Christianity was included under the definition of religion,
and that Catholicism was included as a religion. Brutus, one of the more famous of the
Anti-Federalists, wrote in opposition to the national power to maintain a standing army in
times of peace. He wrote against another who had asserted that standing armies were no
threat because of the habits of the American people such that one might as well try to
establish the "Mahometan religion" as try to have a standing army the opponent claimed.
Brutus IX, in

15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONsTrrUTION 393 (J.

Kaminski & G. Saladino eds., 1984) (Originally printed in the New York Journal on Jan. 17,
1788). Brutus quoted his opponents' phrase "Mahometan religion" recognizing that Islam was
accepted as a religion, although not one commonly adhered to in the United States.
310.

Philadelphiensis VI, in

15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE

CONsTlTUTION 106 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino
Philadelphia Freeman's Journal on Dec. 26, 1788).

eds., 1983) (Originally printed

in the
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remorse."31' While the historical accuracy of the claim is suspect,
what is clear is that Philadelphiensis acknowledged Islam as a
religion.
The different state conventions proposed amendments to the
Constitution to protect religious liberty. Of the seven states that
proposed amendments, five proposed amendments protecting
religious freedom, 312 with North Carolina and Rhode Island closely
following the formulation of Virginia's religious freedom
amendment.3 13 North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Virginia found
religion equivalent to a belief system that included a duty to the
believer's creator: "[tihat religion or the duty which we owe to our
3 14
Creator," being the opening phrase of the proposed amendments.
The Virginia proposal, in turn, was drawn from the Virginia
Declaration of Rights of 1776.315
The debates over the language of what was to become the First
Amendment are almost thoroughly unenlightening as the meaning
of what was protected - religion. At one point in the debate,
Madison proposed adding the word "national" in front of religion so
as to better "point the amendment directly to the object it was
intended to prevent" which was that "one sect might obtain
316
pre-eminence, or two combine together and establish a religion."
In a sense, then, what Madison and what the "people feared" was
the obtaining of power by one subgroup of the larger Christian
religion. While the purported object, prevention of domination by
one Christian sect, does not necessarily imply that the word
religion in the First Amendment meant only the Christian religion,
it does urge that what motivated the Ratifiers was not a threat
posed by any religion other than Christianity, and that in the
context of the First Amendment the word religion may have taken
317
on a narrower meaning.
At different times in the debates the dichotomy of "conscience"
311. Id. See also Pennsylvania Packet, in 18 TRE DocuME RAY HISTORY OF THE
RATiFICATION OF THE CONsTITUTION 377-78 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds., 1995) (June 10,
1788) (calling Muslims the "Mohamidan impostures of religion").
312. McConnell, supra note 167, at 1480.
313. THE COMPLETE BiLu OF RIGHTS 12-13.
314. Id. at 12.
315. Id. at 44.
316. Id. at 2.
317. See also id. at 12-13 (listing the proposed amendments by the state ratification
conventions in which New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island and Virginia all proposed
amendments that would have restrained Congress from establishing one "particular religious
sect"). See also 2 STORY, supra note 4, at 594 (supporting a narrow meaning of religion in the
First Amendment).
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and "religion" would appear.38 The First Congress eventually
settled on using "free exercise" of "religion," opting for the broader
protection afforded by "religion."3 9 Religion connotes a "community
of believers" and allows for protection of the "corporate or
institutional aspects of religious belief."320 The Framers
consequently chose to extend protection to religion, a term seen as
having a basis in theistic beliefs, as opposed to "conscience" which
may have had secular undertones. 321 This was done, as
Representative Samuel Harrington said, "to secure the rights of
conscience, and a free exercise of the rights of religion, but not to
3
patronize those who professed no religion at all." 22
The purpose of exempting free exercise of a religious nature was
"rooted in the prevailing understandings . . . of the difference
between religious faith and other forms of human judgement."32 In
other words, if a religious believer felt obligated to obey God as
opposed to a command of the earthly sovereign, the conflict was
not brought on by the individual believer (as would be understood
today where all beliefs are seen as a product of individual will) but
was a conflict between God and the sovereign where the believer
could not but choose to follow God, the highest sovereign. 34 As a
result, religious beliefs were ordered differently than beliefs based
on other, secular, rationale. Madison, building on Locke's
separation of the religious and civil spheres 325 in his Memorial and
Remonstrance, argued for religious freedom based on the conflict
6
of sovereigns' rationale.3
318. THE CoMPLETE BIL OF RIGHTS 1-9. Conscience, the basis of the Protestant
Reformation, is in respect to the relationship between the individual and God. See
McConnell, supra note 167, at 1490. Conscience was defined by Webster in 1807 as "natural
knowledge, or the faculty that decides on the right or wrong of actions in regard to one's
self." NOAH WEBSTER, A DICIONARY OF ThE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 301 (New Haven 1807). This
definition does not cage "conscience" to any necessarily religious or theistic basis. To most
Americans, and in most references, however, conscience is a shorthand reference to freedom
of religious beliefs or one's religious views of God. See McConnell, supra note 167, at 1493-94
(offering examples of the common understanding of conscience).
319. See McConnell, supra note 167, at 1490-1500 (outlining the growth and effect of
the distinction between conscience and religion).
320. Id. at 1490.
321. Id. at 1495.
322. Id. (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 779 (Gales & Seaton eds., 1834).
323. Id. at 1496.
324. See McConnell, supra note 167, at 1496-97.
325. See supra notes 220-30 and accompanying text for Locke's treatment of conflict
between religion and civil government.
326. McConnell, supra note 167, at 1497 (citing J. MADISON, Memorial and
Remonstrance, Against Religious Assessments, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183 (G.
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There are two clauses relating to religion in the First
Amendment: the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. The
general purposes underlying the two clauses are comparable in that
both are aimed at excluding the federal government from
intermeddling with the religious beliefs or practices of citizens of
the states, either through the direct infringement of the individual's
s The
freedom 327 or through harm to the state's established religion. 32
Free Speech Clause, despite much controversy surrounding the
extent of its protection, likely was intended to codify the common
law of sedition, or perhaps expand the protections afforded the
defendant in common law sedition trials.3 29 The purpose behind the
Free Speech Clause was the product of the new conception of
sovereignty under the Constitution: "[tjhe people, not the
Hunt ed. 1901).
327. See id. at 1415 (finding that the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause was to
broadly protect expressions of religious faith).
328. See ROBERT L CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND
CuRR r FICTION (1982) (promoting a nonpreferentialist interpretation of the Establishment
Clause such that aid which neutrally aids all religion is not prohibited). But see LEONARD W.
LEVY, THE ESTABLISHmENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT xvii (2d ed. 1994)

(rejecting Cord's interpretation and asserting that the Establishment Clause "meant to its
framers and Ratifiers that there should be no [direct] government aid for religions"). Levy
places much emphasis on the use of "respecting" in the Establishment Clause, finding
"respecting" equivalent to concerning or touching. Id. at xxi. This is coupled with the fact
that Levy broadly reads "establishment" to mean nearly any aid to religion. Thus, the
Establishment Clause means that government may not aid religion.
329. The truth would be a defense to the charge and the jury would determine, not
merely whether the defendant had said or printed the words underlying the offense, but
whether, in fact, the defendant was guilty of common law sedition. See LEONARD LEvY, LEGACY
OF SUPPRESSION:

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND

PRESS IN EARLY

AMERICAN HISTORY

195 (1960)

(discussing the correspondence of John Adams and Chief Justice Cushing dealing with the
Alien and Sedition Acts where Adams argued that under the Constitution the Acts were
constitutional because of their liberal allowances for truth as a defense and because the jury
decides guilt) [hereinafter LEvI, LEGACY]. While it is true that Levy more recently, revised the
thesis of Legacy of Suppression, he still maintained that "the revolutionary generation did
not seek to wipe out the core idea of seditious libel, that the government may be criminally
assaulted by mere words.., that English libertarian theory usually stayed inthe vanguard of
American theory... and that the first amendment was as much an expression of federalism
as of libertarianism." Leonard W. Levy, The Legacy Reexamined, 37 STAN. L Rsv. 767 (1985).
Levy conceded that the practice of the press at the time of ratification of the First
Amendment was much less constrained than a vigorously enforced law against sedition
would allow. Id. at 768. David Rabban criticized Levy for failing to "recognize that is was
possible for the framers of the first amendment, influenced by republican political theory, to
expand the protection for freedom of expression well beyond the narrow boundaries of the
English common law while retaining some conception of seditious libel." David M. Rabban,
The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American
History, 37 STAN. L REv. 795, 796 (1985) (book review). Rabban claims that the First
Amendment preserved some law of seditious libel while expanding beyond the common law
understanding of free speech. Id. at 801.
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government, possessed 'the absolute sovereignty' and placed the
legislature as well as the executive under limitations of power by
constitutions that were paramount to legislative acts."m As a result,
free speech was instrumental (not an end in itself) in allowing the
people to make the best decision possible when electing
representatives. 331 This rationale was cabined, however, by the
desire to preserve the government and society from the supposed
threat posed by seditious libel - libel that threatened to bring the
government into disrepute in the minds of its citizens. 332
Consequently, the narrow original purpose of free speech has no
application to the definition of religion or the purposes of the
religion clauses.
The purpose grounding the Free Exercise Clause, the protection
of the individual's expressions of religious faith, does not expand
the definition of which belief systems qualify as religions under the
First Amendment. As previously discussed, the protection of
religious exercise originates from Locke and his notion that since
religious belief is motivated by God, the civil magistrate has no
authority over the exercise of that belief in this world unless and
until the religious exercise interferes with the rights of another.m If
one is motivated to act by non-religious beliefs, there is no
imperative that the civil authorities in this world allow such actions
because the person motivated is not subject to punishment in the
next world for failure to act. In addition, as Madison argued in
his Memorial and Remonstrance, it was immoral to make the
330. See LEvY, LEGACY supra note 329, at 274-75 (1960) (quoting James Madison, 4
ELuo'rs DEBATES 569). See also Rabban, supra note 329, at 805-06, 816-19 (discussing the
purpose behind free speech).
331. LEVY, LEGACY supra note 329, at 236-37. See also Thomas I. Emerson, Colonial
Intentions and Current Realities of the First Amendment, 125 U. PA L Rgv. 737, 74142
(1977) (claiming that since the Constitution and the United States was based on a theory of
the consent of the governed, the governed must have the freedom to arrive at individual
jivdgements as to who is the best representative to serve them).
332. LEvy, LEGACY supra note 329, at 237.
333. See John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration 9-19, in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN
LocKE (London 1823). One example of the different treatment accorded religiously motivated
behavior and politically motivated actions can be found in the Virginia Statute of Religious
Freedom of 1785, where the author, Jefferson, inserted an overt acts test to determine the
extent to which religious exercise would receive protection - to the extent the religious
exercise did not "pick[] my pocket [or] break[] my leg," as Jefferson later stated. Thomas
Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 159 (W. Peden ed. 1955).
334. See McConnell, supra note 167, at 1453 (quoting James Madison, Memorial and
Remonstrance at 183-84) (noting "this duty to the Creator is 'precedent both in order of time
and degree of obligation, to the claims of civil society' and 'therefore that in matters of
Religion, no man's right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society' ").
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religious adherent choose between following the dictates of God
and of the state, when the state could accommodate the religious
action motivated by God.33 Without the religious imperative of
God's commands to the individual, there is no reason for the state,
which is supreme in this world, to grant an exemption to the
individual or protect ' his actions from otherwise generally
applicable laws. Thus, it is the nature of the religious command
(duties) from God, and the future state of rewards and punishment
that motivates the Free Exercise Clause.3
The purpose behind the Establishment Clause, the preservation
of state establishments, also does not argue for a broader definition
of religion. The Establishment Clause is simply a recognition of the
state establishments existing in 1791, and was intended to prevent
the federal government from interfering with those establishments.
The historical evidence does not point to a bifurcated definition of
religion since the establishments in existence in 1791 were all of
the type that the definition of religion offered by this Article would
encompass. The purpose of the Establishment Clause was narrow
in the sense that it was to prevent the federal government from
interfering in this one area, religious establishments, of a state's
jurisdiction.
There does not appear to have been much public debate
surrounding the proposal and ratification of the First Amendment
itself. Perhaps because the guarantee was asked for by numerous
states and was thus expected and invited, and certainly because of
the lack of documentation, there is little said concerning religion in
the First Amendment itself. What little that does appear from the
debates surrounding the adoption of the Amendment itself or from
other contemporaneous sources, generally places religion in the
context of a monotheistic belief, with, as in Madison's Memorial
and Remonstrance, duties on the believer.
335. See id.
336. This purpose could be argued to expand the definition of religion to all theistic
beliefs, and not limit the definition of religion to monotheistic beliefs alone. The purpose
underlying the Free Exercise Clause could not be used, however, to expand the definition of
religion to non-theistic belief systems. The difficulty of expanding the definition to include all
theistic beliefs is that the purposes underlying originalism are not then served. The theory of
the just state drives the originalist to look to the contemporary meaning of the words of the
Constitution, not its underlying purposes. Also, the other normative values advanced by
originalists, especially stability and democratic theory, caution against allowing the judiciary
to expand the definition of religion as it sees fit based on what it perceives to be the
purpose of the Free Exercise Clause.
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IMPACT OF THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF RELIGION ON CURRENT
JURISPRUDENCE

So far, this Article has made two interrelated claims: (1) that the
original meaning of the text of the Constitution is morally binding
on judges; and (2) that the original meaning of religion is a
monotheistic belief system, such as Christianity, that holds true to
a future state of rewards and punishments and thus imposes duties
on believers in this world. In contexts where a citizen seeks the
invalidation of a non-neutral or non-generally applicable law, 33v
where a citizen seeks a statutory religious exemption (assuming the
exemption is keyed to the original meaning),m where citizens claim
that a religion is being established,m or where the government uses
the Establishment Clause as a defense, 340 application of the original
meaning will affect the Court's jurisprudence. The more restrictive
definition of religion provided by originalism will not affect many
areas of religious life because of the broad reading of other rights
protected by the Bill of Rights. Thus, the jurisprudentially
established right to free speech and expression will cover many
337. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Smith greatly changed the
Free Exercise landscape, especially as far as the original meaning definition is coicerned.
Religion and what is a religion will only rarely come into play as few laws today target
religions and would thus fall under the suzerainty of the Free Exercise Clause. Id.
338. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163, 166 (1965).
339. See, e.g., R.I. Fed'n of Teachers v. Norberg, 630 F.2d 850 (1st Cir. 1980) (rejecting
the plaintiff parents' claim that the public schools of Rhode Island necessarily advance a
moral system, which in this case would be secular humanism); Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs
of Mobile County, 655 F Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala. 1987) (finding that the Alabama public schools
had established Secular Humanism as the official religion), overruled by Smith v. Bd. of Sch.
Comm'rs of Mobile County, 827 F2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding that the Alabama public
schools had not established secular humanism as a religion even assuming secular humanism
is a religion within the meaning of the First Amendment); Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch.
Dist., 37 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1993) (ruling against the plaintiffs' claim that the teaching of
evolution is establishment of a religion, finding that the teaching of evolution is not
considered a religion for Establishment Clause purposes); Fleisherfresser v. Dirs. of Sch.
Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding parents' claim that the books used in the public
school established secular humanism was unsupported); Doe v. Human, 725 F Supp. 1503,
1508 n.2 (W.D. Ark. 1989) (declining to address whether the textbooks used in the
defendant's schools established secular humanism as a religion).
340. Rosenberger v. Univ. of VA, 515 U.S. 819 (1995), is an example of the government
using the Establishment Clause as a reason or defense to exclude religion. In Rosenberger,
however, the religion being excluded was a traditional Christianity that would be covered by
the original meaning and would thus have no affect on the litigation or the school's defense.
Only where the government attempts to exclude a "religion" that does not fall within the
framework of the original meaning, such as secular humanism, would its defense be
precluded.
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instances where the expression is religiously motivated.3 41
In the Free Exercise context, while Smith has obviated the need
for a constitutional definition of religion in many cases, 34 2 there will
still be situations where laws are perhaps targeted at a religion,
thus invoking the protections of the Free Exercise Clause.m In
Church of the Lukumi v. Hialeah,m the Supreme Court faced what
is reasonably described as a non-monotheistic belief system, which
did not ascribe to a future state of rewards and punishment, and
that did impose duties on its adherents. The Court did not
explicitly address whether the Santeria faith was in fact a religion,
but treated it as a religion in finding that its free exercise rights
had been violated345
In the realm of the Establishment Clause, persons who sue
claiming that the government has established a religion, when the
religion is secular humanism, would not prevail under the original
meaning of the Constitution. 46 Secular humanism is a belief system
that places individual autonomy as the penultimate belief, and
claims that value is individual relative, guided by human reason.
With these beliefs, secular humanism is not considered a religion
by even the most attenuated originalist definition, and thus persons
seeking to prevent the government from espousing such beliefs
would not succeed under the original meaning of religion.
Finally, if the government seeks to exclude certain groups that
are religious in the modem, broad sense, from access to fora that
religious groups (traditionally understood) are admitted to does not
constitute discrimination in violation of the establishment clause. If
a group's belief system does not conform to the original meaning of
a religion, that group has no establishment clause claim.347 The
exclusionary government would not have the defense, however, of
avoiding Establishment Clause problems in a free speech claim by
the excluded group.
341. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (upholding,
under the Free Speech Clause, the right of Jehovah Witness children not to pledge allegiance
to the United States Flag).
342. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
343. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(finding that a city ordinance targeted at the plaintiff church's religion violated the Free
Exercise Clause because the ordinance was neither neutral nor of general application).
344. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
345. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 531.
346. See supra note 339 (listing cases where such claims were made).
347. The group may, depending on the Court's jurisprudence, have a claim of free
speech rights.
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In summation, depending on the extent of the originalist
transformation of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence outside of the
religion context, the moral imperative to use the original meaning
of religion may have a more or less pronounced affect on the
claims of putatively religious groups.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article has presented a variety of arguments supporting
original meaning interpretation. Without relying on one or another
normative value to support originalism, this Article has proposed to
base originalism in the just state, making originalism a moral
prerequisite to constitutional interpretation. As we have seen, the
moral state is the minimalist state where all have a duty to bring
about and uphold just institutions. Original meaning interpretation
leads to the original minimalist state, and hence, judges are morally
obligated to use original meaning interpretation.
The definition ascertained as the original meaning of the word
religion in the First Amendment has the virtue of being clear and
readily applicable. In addition, since the definition is faithful to
what the Ratifiers believed the word religion to mean, enforcement
by the Supreme Court is morally required. Finally, the definition
provided by the original meaning fulfills the purposes originally
intended for the religion clauses in the First Amendment without
resorting to value laden, subjective, amorphous definitions that
broaden (or narrow) the scope of religion out of proportion to its
purposes.
This Article has run the gamut of history searching for clues as
to the meaning attributed to the word religion in the First
Amendment by the Framers and Ratifiers. America has its origins
and basis in the Protestant, Christian experience. While there was
some expansion to the term religion during and after the
Revolution, it appears that religion to the Framers and Ratifiers
remained a monotheistic belief in one God, with duties towards
that God, and a future state of rewards and punishment.

